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Abstract 
 
Only 10% of big construction projects end up within the planned budget and 6 out of ten 
construction projects face time overruns (Flybjerg et al., 2010). These problems are very tangible, 
especially if the project’s price bracket is the six-digit number or even more. There are a lot of 
explanations why do time and costs overruns occur, but all of them can be considered forms of 
uncertainties, which could be conventionally divided into three groups: uncertainties in 
estimates, uncertainties related to the project parties and uncertainties associated with the stages 
in the project life cycle. In this regard, study of management control systems in handling 
uncertainties of big construction projects seems to be important.  
 
The purpose of this study is to explore and compare how uncertainties are being managed in big 
construction projects in different contexts. One Norwegian and one Ukrainian big construction 
projects are chosen for investigation. Empirical results are mainly obtained from six interviews 
with “key figures” in management of construction of studied projects.  
 
Examining the MCS in Norwegian and Ukrainian projects, I have obtained interesting results, 
which are contrary to the expectations and assumptions of the theoretical framework. It became 
known that both Ukrainian and Norwegian projects managers utilized very similar MCS for 
handling uncertainties: a combination of belief, boundary, interactive and diagnostic controls. 
The inequalities can be seen only in belief and boundary systems, which could be explained due 
to the cultural differences between Norway and Ukraine. Meanwhile, diagnostic and interactive 
control systems are almost identical in both projects. Thus, it seems that internationalization and 
globalization of economy harmonize the contexts, in which big international projects execute, 
and consequently the choice of tools and MCS used for handling uncertainties in international 
construction projects. 
 
 
 
Keywords: uncertainty, management control, management control systems, big construction 
projects, project management, projects’ life cycle, projects’ stakeholders.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
“If you do not have uncertainty, you do not have any evolution” 
Perminova et al, 2008 
 
1.1 Background of the thesis  
 
Thousands or even millions of different projects realize every year. Projects can be various 
shapes and sizes, from the small and straightforward to extremely large and highly complex. 
Most of the big construction projects have international character and involve a lot of contractors 
and subcontractors from different countries. These projects are usually very complex, and their 
values exceed six-digit numbers. What is interesting is that 9 out of ten construction projects 
(90%) have underestimated costs, and 6 out of ten construction projects (60%) end up with time 
overruns (Flyvbjerg et al., 2010). Harvard Design Magazine reports that Sydney Opera House, 
for example, was completed ten years late and cost 15 times more than it was originally 
projected (Flyvbjerg, 2005). There are a lot of explanations why do time and costs overruns 
occur. Numerous studies indicate complexity of projects as one of the main reasons (Ireland, 
2007), other – see the problem in poorly-defined scope (Hubbard, 2009), unstable environment 
(first of all economy and politics), etc., but all of them can be considered forms of uncertainties 
and risks (Flyvbjerg, 2008).   
 
1.2 Why is it important to study uncertainties in big construction projects? 
 
Every project is unique endeavour, and even if the project is repetitive, it is still unique, because 
it always creates a new result. The primary challenge of project management (PM) is to achieve 
all of the engineering project goals (Ireland, 2006) while honouring the preconceived project 
constraints (Phillips, 2003). Typical constraints are scope, time, and budget, often called an “Iron 
Triangle” (Atkinson, 1999). Every side of the triangle represents a constraint: one side of the 
triangle cannot be changed without affecting the others. The time constraint refers to the amount 
of time available to complete a project. The cost constraint refers to the budgeted amount 
available for the project. The scope constraint refers to what must be done to produce the 
project’s end result. Thus, every project demands accomplishment of unique scope of works 
within strict constrains. Moreover, the final product or result of the project has to meet quality 
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requirements. Many factors as well as different parties are involved in project’s realization. 
Therefore, a lot of unknown and unpredictable factors could appear and influence the project 
(Akintoye & MacLeod, 1997). These “unknown factors” should be understood and managed 
(Ward & Chapman, 2003). Handling uncertainties must be based not only on delivering projects 
on time, within budget and quality requirements, but also with meeting or exceeding 
stakeholders’ expectations.  
 
It is important to establish distinction between the terms risk and uncertainty. According to 
Knight (1921) uncertainty is immeasurable, not possible to calculate, while the risk is 
measurable. Hubbard (2009) describes uncertainty and risks as follows: 
- Uncertainty – a lack of complete certainty, an existence of more than one possibility. The 
“true” outcome/state/result/value is not known. 
- Risk – a state of uncertainty where some possible outcomes have an undesired effect or 
significant loss.  
 
Hubbard uses the terms so that one may have uncertainty without risk, but not risk without 
uncertainty. The measure of uncertainty refers only to the probabilities assigned to outcomes, 
while the measure of risk requires both probabilities for outcomes and losses quantified for 
outcomes. Thus, uncertainty has a problematic feature that managers have a limited framework 
of reference to base their decisions on (Leijten, 2010). True uncertainty implies that neither the 
possible outcomes, nor the probability of occurrence can be foreseen. Therefore, in my work I 
use term “uncertainty” as an event that cannot be foreseen in advance deriving from the lack of 
knowledge, while “risk” is the potential that a chosen action or activity will lead to a loss (or an 
undesirable outcome). I do not describe the probabilities for losses of the outcomes of the 
projects, thus I use term “uncertainty”.  
 
1.3 Relevance of the research and need for knowledge  
 
The study of managing uncertainties in big construction projects is in the line of the most topical 
themes for research nowadays (Berry et al., 2009).  Thus, it seems essential that more emphasis 
should be placed on the study of real control systems as they operate in practice, especially 
design and use of MCS (Berry et al., 2009), because control is that element of a construction 
project that keeps it on-track, on-time and within budget (Lewis, 2000): it begins early in the 
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project with planning and ends late in the project with post-implementation review, having a 
thorough involvement of each step in the process. Thus, each project should be assessed for the 
appropriate level of control needed: too much control is too time consuming, too little control is 
very risky.  Before accepting responsibility for a project, the project manager must know exactly 
what type of the project is and what are the main projects’ constrains. It is important also to 
reveal on the earlier stages, which stakeholders have the strongest impact and interests in the 
project (Turner, 2006). When the project manager and his team know all these components, they 
can start detailed planning, negotiation for resources and building the necessary MCS, which 
helps them, for instance, to monitor and correct results achieved with results planned. 
 
1.4 Problem statement and research questions 
 
Uncertainty management has become a common element of preparation and implementation 
processes, particularly in the construction projects (Turner, 2006). Despite this development, 
project managers still face certain grades of uncertainties and difficulties to overcome them. This 
work focuses on two big construction projects in different contexts (two case-studies). These two 
have been studied elaborately.  
 
Problem statement of the paper is:  
 
 
 
 
The main research questions are: 
1) What are major uncertainties in relation to construction projects in Ukraine and Norway? 
How are they managed? 
2) What are the differences and similarities between management control systems in 
handling uncertainties in construction projects in Norway and Ukraine? 
 
In order to accomplish the task I use examples of two big projects (which have been realized 
recently, but did not meet their initial plans): 
- A project of construction of Norway’s one of the most famous sporting arenas, built to 
the Ski World Championship 2011 – “Holmenkollen” (Oslo, Norway); 
How are uncertainties being managed in big construction projects in 
different contexts? 
 
A comparative study of big construction projects in Ukraine and Norway 
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- Construction project of the biggest stadium in Eastern Europe designed and built to 
UEFA elite standards and for the EURO 2012 – “Donbass Arena” (Donetsk, Ukraine).  
 
1.5 Why do I want to investigate big construction projects in Norway and Ukraine? 
 
In my research I do analyse MCS of big construction projects in different contexts. According to 
the theoretical framework (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Levitt & Mahalingam, 2007; Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977; Miroshnik, 2002), construction industry in another country may have different 
instances of the same institutions, local rules, building codes and practices that lead to different 
taken-for-granted regularities of behaviour and different tools of MC used to handle 
uncertainties, which arise during the PLC. Thus, MCS are likely to be differentially implicated in 
different countries (Harrison & McKinnon, 1999). 
 
Therefore, I have chosen construction projects, which were realized in different contexts, but 
within the same industry and with similar constrains1. It gives me an opportunity to compare 
MCS in handling uncertainties of construction projects in different countries. The projects under 
study are international, because they involved many foreign contractors and subcontractors. They 
both were constructed for the big sporting events and became local symbols of Norway and 
Ukraine. These countries are both situated in Europe, but have different economies, traditions 
and norms, etc.  
 
Norway is a stable, well-developed country with standards of living that are among the highest in 
the world. Norway as well as Ukraine is not a part of European Union, but it actively participates 
in the European Union’s single market2. Norway is very open state in terms of its business. It is a 
part of Schengen area, which makes cooperation with other European countries easier. Ukraine is 
relatively young country, with unstable economy, weak political and law systems. With the 
dissolution of the Soviet system, the country moved from a planned economy to a market 
economy. Ukraine is not a part of European Union and Schengen Area. Ukraine currently 
balances its relationship with Europe and the United States with strong ties to Russia. The World 
                                                 
1
 Detailed information about projects is in Methodological part (subparagraph – “Argumentation in support to the 
projects’ choice”).  
2
 http://lovdata.no/ (EØS-loven — EØSl. Lov om gjennomføring i norsk rett av hoveddelen i avtale om Det 
europeiske økonomiske samarbeidsområde).  
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Bank classifies Ukraine as a middle-income state3. Significant issues include underdeveloped 
infrastructure and transportation, corruption and bureaucracy (Pogarska, 2008). Thus, two 
projects which were chosen for my research have been realized within different institutional 
environments. Therefore, it is possible to assume that groups of uncertainties, their sources and 
management control tools used for handing these uncertainties in Ukrainian and Norwegian 
projects will defer significantly.    
 
Access to the persons involved in management of these two big construction projects and 
possibility of getting formal and informal information in regard to the projects management and 
management control were considered as important factors while choosing the topic and the 
objects of the research. Thus, theoretical and practical background, as well as the access to the 
primary data, some project documentation has played a significant role in choosing the topic for 
my research. Theoretical motivation includes incentives to study how uncertainties were 
managed in the different construction projects. From the practical side, I would like to compare 
the MCS used for managing uncertainties in Norway and Ukraine.  
 
1.6 How do I plan to achieve the goal of my research? 
 
For conducting a research I use qualitative analysis, and the semi-structured interviews as a 
major instrument of collecting data. I analyse project documentation as well as the other 
secondary data (information from the official web-sites, books, theses, earlier publications in the 
particular field, etc.). To highlight the research problem I use case-study research strategy, 
communicating directly to the “first persons” of the big construction projects both in Norway 
and Ukraine.  
 
The theoretical framework combined into one united approach and consists of two major parts: 
theory of Project Management (Aaltonen, 2011; Yang, 2010; Atkinson, 1999; Turner, 2006; 
Toor & Ogunlana, 2010; and others) and Management Control (Simons, 1995; Canonico & 
Söderlund, 2010; Leijten, 2010; etc.). Along with the above mentioned sources I apply to the 
institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer, Rowan, 1977, etc.) in order to define 
cross-national similarities and differences in the big construction projects. I use also widely 
known standard among theoreticians and practitioners – A Guide to the Project Management 
                                                 
3
 http://www.worldbank.org.ua/ (What are Middle-Income Countries?) 
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Body of Knowledge (PMBOK, 2008), developed by the Project Management Institute, in order 
to describe the basic definitions of the Project Management.  
 
1.7 Structure of the thesis  
 
To answer the research questions following structure of the Master Thesis was chosen  (Fig. 1.1): 
Chapter 1 provides the reader with introduction and background of the research, a theoretical 
framework is presented in the Chapter 2, including the most important and relevant theories for 
the problem statement. Chapter 3 describes the methodology used for conducting our research. 
Empirical findings are described in the Chapter 4 and analysis and discussion are conducted in 
the Chapter 5. Finally there are conclusions and some other openings for future research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.1 Structure of Master Thesis 
 
Introduction 
Theoretical framework Methodological part 
Empirical findings  
Analysis and discussion  
Conclusions 
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II. THEORETICAL PART 
 
In this chapter I introduce to the reader important concepts and components that underpin the 
relevant theory to the problem statement, and hence, help me to design empirical and analytical 
parts. I describe main groups of uncertainties related to the big construction projects, and then 
apply management control theories in order to understand how these uncertainties could be 
managed in different contexts from the theoretical perspective. In the end of the theoretical 
chapter I present a model for analysing components of MC in different contexts. 
 
2.1 Nature of the projects and their management 
 
“A project is different from usual work. It has a single focus. It is a child in the 
midst of a family of adolescent and adult tasks” 
Lientz & Rea, Project Management for the 21st Century 
 
2.1.1 What is a Project? 
 
The PMBOK defines a project in terms of its distinctive characteristics: “A project is a 
temporary endeavour undertaken to create a unique product, service or result”. Projects have 
social, economic, and environmental impacts that far outlast the projects themselves (PMBOK, 
2008). Projects are temporary and unique, they are undertaken to achieve an objective, 
conforming to specific requirement on time, costs and resources, often called an “Iron Triangle” 
(illustrated in the Fig. 2.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.1 Iron Triangle (Atkinson, 1999) 
 
Scope 
Project 
Time Cost 
Master Thesis 2011 
 
8 
 
Every side of the triangle represents a constraint: one side of the triangle cannot be changed 
without affecting the others. The time constraint refers to the amount of time available to 
complete a project. The cost constraint refers to the budgeted amount available for the project. 
The scope constraint refers to what must be done to produce the project’s end result. It is worthy 
to note that in the latest versions of the PMBOK, PMI has done away with the project triangle, 
the reason for this is that a project has many more constraints to be observed other than the 
scope, the time, and the cost.  
 
Balancing the competing project constrains including, but not limited to (PMBOK, 2008): scope, 
quality, schedule, budget, resources and risks. The relationship between these factors is such if 
any factor changes at least one other factor is likely to be affected (e.g. if the schedule is 
shortened, often the budget needs to be increased; changing the project requirements may create 
additional risks, etc.). Frigenti & Comninos (2002) marked out three factors that differentiate 
projects from routine operations:  
 
- Uniqueness. Even if the project is repetitive all the time it is unique, because it creates a 
unique product, service, or result. For example, office buildings are constructed with the 
same or similar materials or by the same team, but each location is unique – with a 
different design, different circumstances, different contractors, etc. (PMBOK, 2008).  
- A temporary nature indicates a definite beginning and end. The end is reached when the 
project’s objectives have been achieved or when the project is terminated because its 
objectives will not or cannot be met, or when the need for the project no longer exists. 
Temporary does not necessarily mean short in duration, most projects are undertaken to 
create a lasting outcome.  
- Progressive elaboration. Due to the uniqueness of project results, the precise details in 
terms of the deliverables contributing to the results are not known from the outset. 
Because of this, the deliverables’ characteristics, and in fact the project parameters will 
need to be progressively elaborated. The two words are defined as follows: 1) 
progressively – proceeding in steps; continuing steadily by increments; 2) elaborated – 
worked out with care; developed thoroughly. Different authors sometimes call the third 
factor uncertainties about the outcome (instead of progressive elaboration), e.g. PMBOK 
(2008).  
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2.1.2 Types of projects  
 
Before accepting responsibility for a project, the project manager may need to negotiate for 
resources. Knowing the type of project is the key to this. There are different types of the projects, 
subjected to different criteria, e.g. projects that cost more than $1 bln and last 5-7 years are 
called megaprojects, at the same time these projects can have commercial or non-commercial 
goals, local, regional of international character and so on (Appendix A). There are also multi-
criteria approaches for defining types of the projects. Frigenti & Comninos (2002) proposed to 
distinguish projects as Fog, Movie, Quest and Painting by Numbers. They are defined by how 
much is known about the ultimate goal, and the level of knowledge about how to reach that goal: 
- “Painting by Numbers” are the projects where the stakeholders all know exactly what 
needs to be done, and how it needs to be done. Problems that may arise during the 
realization of such type of the projects are usually quite predictable. Typical example of 
painting by numbers project is building a house, where the project manager and his 
employer have experience in this trade. 
- “Going on a Quest”: The stakeholders know what they want to achieve, but are not clear 
how. The project manager can negotiate for resources based on the large number of 
unknowns. The example is R&D project.  
- “Making a Movie”: The methods to be used are known, but the end result is not clear. 
For example, creative projects, where the final result could be a masterpiece or a flop. 
- “Walking in the Fog”: The most difficult type of project. The main stakeholders are not 
only unclear about how things need to be done, but are also not totally sure about what 
the end result should be. This type of project needs a strong leader, and he must ensure 
that the project has the complete commitment and support of the senior stakeholders. The 
example of such project is introduction of a new Business Excellence program (e.g. Six 
Sigma or Lean Manufacturing4).  
 
Table 2.1 analyses the four project types in terms of project processes and tools, and a suggested 
management approach. The management approach described in Table 2.1 is useful on the earlier 
stages of project. ‘Fog’ or ‘quest’ projects need a good leader, progressive elaboration and step-
by-step plans. In the ‘movie’ cases it is better not to spend too much time on planning and 
                                                 
4
 http://www.suite101.com/content/project-management-a98155 
Master Thesis 2011 
 
10 
 
concentrate attention on the final result. In the ‘painting by numbers’ situations it is important to 
take into account all the risks, constrains of the project and interests of all parties involved.  
 
Table 2.1 Four types on the projects (adapted from Frigenti & Comninos, 2002) 
 
Project type 
(description by 
Obeng) 
Project Management approach 
Process Tools 
Fog 
- Pure research  
- Change 
initiatives  
- First-time 
projects 
Not well 
understood 
Not well 
developed 
Proceed with caution one step at a time. Focus 
on the nest beacon and carefully move towards 
it. Having reached a beacon, the path to the 
next beacon becomes clear through the fog 
Movie  
- Film production  
- Systems 
development 
- Prototype 
development 
Well 
understood 
Well 
developed 
Because the PM and production processes are 
well known, avoid spending too much time on 
definition and planning. It is better to 
concentrate on finding a good product (script), 
and the project process will be easily managed  
Quest  
- Business 
improvement 
- Product 
development  
Not well 
understood 
Not 
necessarily  
well 
developed 
The projects require considerable research in 
the project initiation and definition phases, so 
a picture can be built up of a means approach 
required to achieve the final outcome. Care 
should be taken not to get into too much 
detailed planning and design, but rather 
progressively elaborate the project.   
Painting by 
numbers  
- Construction 
and engineering  
- Similar projects 
done in the past  
 
Very well 
understood 
Very well 
developed 
Painting by numbers projects are complex, and 
tend to be large and involve many parties. As 
time and costs are predictable, the challenge is 
to deliver within tight financial, time and 
specification constrains. Diligent application 
of process and workflow is critical to success.  
 
Projects can generally be classified as being of a Fog, Quest, Movie or Painting by Numbers 
type. As a project elaborates it can move from one state to another. For example, the early stages 
of a business improvement project could be described as ‘fog’. As clarity emerges, targets for 
improvement are set, moving the project into a ‘quest’ state, but the best approach to achieve the 
project is not yet clear. As the project further elaborates, the design and implementation details 
emerge which, when sufficiently clear, lead to the ‘painting by numbers’ state. During the 
implementation the project is predominantly in the ‘painting by numbers’ state, although it may 
at times need to revert back to ‘quest’ or ‘fog’ if unforeseen factors arise, requiring further 
elaboration.  
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The uniqueness nature and limited duration of projects require additional efforts to build 
effective project teams and generate trust, both within the team and between the team and the 
project stakeholders, i.e. interested parties (Grabher, 2002). It is very important also to 
understand what uncertainties and risks are involved in the project and how to manage them.  
 
2.2 Understanding uncertainties of the project  
 
There are several approaches to classify uncertainties related to projects. Some authors observe 
sources of uncertainties, another separate them according to potential impacts, etc. Table 2.2 
represents a short summary on existing approaches.  
 
Table 2.2 Different approaches for classifying uncertainties in projects 
 
Criteria Author/year Types of uncertainties 
By the 
sources of 
uncertainty 
Jaafari (2001) 
- External (commercial and competitive pressures, 
collision of social, political and institutional norms 
and rules); 
- Shifting business objectives (shifting requirements of 
project stakeholders, etc.) 
- Poorly defined methods for project realisation 
Perminova et al. 
(2007) 
- Internal (system complexity).  
- External (government, industrial standards). 
By nature Leijten (2010) 
- Technical: a technology or work processes to be 
applied is known or prescribed to have a certain 
chance of failure 
- Implementation: apart from the possibility that 
technology or work processes fail once in a certain 
period of time, failure can also occur because actors 
working with the technology deviate from the 
expected work processes.  
By potential 
impact 
Ward, Chapman 
(2001) 
- Variability associated with estimates;  
- Uncertainty about the basis of estimates;  
- Uncertainty about design and logistics;  
- Uncertainties about objectives and priorities;  
- Uncertainties about fundamental relations between 
project parties.  
Jensen, Johansson, 
Löfström (2005) 
- Uncertainties in vertical relations; 
- Uncertainties in horizontal relations 
By parties 
involved 
Zou et al. (2007) 
 
Risks and uncertainties related to: 
- Clients 
- Designers  
- Contractors  
- Suppliers/subcontractors 
- Government agencies 
- External issues 
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In my research I use classification based on the potential impact, developed by Atkinson & 
Crawford (2006). This classification includes all the elements and accumulates in themselves all 
previous researches on this topic. According to Atkinson & Crawford (2006) there are three key 
areas of uncertainties: 
1) Uncertainty in estimates; 
2) Uncertainty associated with project parties; 
3) Uncertainties associated with the stages in the project life cycle. 
Classification developed by Zou et al. (2007) will be used in addition to Atkinson & Crawford’s 
one to give a wider understanding of uncertainties associated with project parties.  
 
2.2.1 Uncertainties in estimates 
 
Uncertainty in any project concerns estimates of potential variability in relation to performance 
measures like cost, duration, or quality related to particular planned activities (Atkinson & 
Crawford, 2006). The causes of uncertainty about estimates may include the following (Buehler, 
Griffin et al., 2002; Armor, Taylor, 2002): 
- lack of a clear specification of what is required; 
- novelty, or lack of experience of this particular activity; 
- complexity in terms of the number of influencing factors and associated inter-
dependencies; 
- limited analysis of the processes involved in the activity; 
- possible occurrence of particular events or conditions which might affect the activity; 
- emerging factors unknowable at the start of the project; 
- bias exhibited by estimators, typically optimism bias. 
 
Thus, uncertainty comes from ambiguity, vagueness and contradictions associated with lack of 
clarity because of lack of data, incomplete and inaccurate detail, lack of structure to consider 
issues, the working and framing assumptions being used to consider the issues, known and 
unknown sources of bias, limited control of relevant project players, and ignorance about how 
much effort it is worth expending to clarify the situation (Chapman & Ward, 2003). Thus, it is 
important to identify the main features and limitations of the project and know how to manage 
different types of the projects. According to the theory there are also other ways to manage 
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uncertainties related to the project’s estimates: using organizational capabilities, culture and 
learning by experience.  
 
Organizational capabilities, i.e. organization structure and work breakdown structure (WBS), 
co-ordination and control systems, environmental scanning capability, communications and 
information systems, knowledge management, and support for organization learning, all affect 
the quality and scope of project management undertaken (Ward, 2005). Organizations which 
have efficient and effective systems for co-ordination and control, environmental scanning, and 
organization learning will be comparatively well placed to foster efficient and effective 
uncertainty management (Atkinson, 2006). Unfortunately, many organizations demonstrate 
scarcity in their approach to uncertainty and learning. Sometimes shortcomings in organizational 
capabilities are not evident until systematic attempts to identify and manage uncertainty are 
made (Dixon, 2000).  
 
If to understand that culture in its nature can be a mechanism for organizational control, it can 
have its impact on the quality of uncertainty management. Culture can become obvious in 
several areas as in planning, formal processes, regulations, attitude to risks and mistakes. These 
cultural characteristics can either facilitate or hinder the development of uncertainty management 
(Handy, 1995). In particular, these cultural behaviours can reflect an inability or unwillingness 
on the part of managers or groups to recognize the difference between (a) bad management and 
poor performance due to factors that are not under a manager’s control; and (b) good managers 
who apply proactive uncertainty management to reduce problems and enhance performance, and 
managers who are just lucky. Addressing such conditions can be one of the most significant 
benefits of formal uncertainty management processes (Atkinson, 2006). 
 
Knowledge management and learning be experience, both in the organizational level and 
individual, are major contributors to uncertainty management in different ways. Quality of 
estimates directly depends on the access to the data and basic information about the industry, 
lows, market, etc. Decreasing of uncertainty directly depends on the reliable data’s availability. 
Nevertheless, many organizations and project managers are not successful in creating data base 
of lessons learnt, or sometimes cannot present such data in the form useful to be used.  
 
2.2.2 Uncertainties associated with project parties 
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The following writers Aaltonen (2011), Atkinson (1999), Toor (2010), Turner (2006), Wateridge 
(1998), Yang (2010) and many others concluded that successful implementation of the project is 
impossible without defining the project’s parties, i.e. stakeholders. The PMBOK (2008) describe 
stakeholders as individuals or organizations, who are actively involved in the project or whose 
interest may be positively or negatively affected by the performance or completion of the project. 
Stakeholders may also exert influence over the project, but the final effect is never exactly 
known. A project may seem successful to the client, but a completely unsuccessful for 
contractors or end users (Toor & Ogunlana, 2010).  
 
In such cases theoreticians recommend to focus on the key stakeholders (Frigenti & Comninos, 
2002), which influence and interests are greater than others. Examples of project stakeholders 
include, but not limited to the customers, owners, user groups, project manager, development 
team, the testers, upper management, resource and line managers, lobbying organizations, and 
society at large. Some of the most important stakeholders are shown in Fig. 2.2. While 
employees and other agents of a project owner are essential to the achieving of project 
performance, they also contribute to uncertainty about future performance (Atkinson & 
Crawford, 2006).  
 
Fig. 2.2 Project’s Stakeholders (Frigenti & Comninos, 2002) 
 
This uncertainty arises due to several factors, including (Ward, 1999): uncertainty about the level 
of performance that will be achieved; the objectives and motivation of each party; the quality and 
reliability of work undertaken; the extent to which each party’s objectives are aligned; with the 
project owner’s objectives, and the scope for moral hazard where one party is motivated to do 
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things which are not in the best interests of the project owner; the actual abilities of the party; 
and availability of the party. 
 
In any organisational context including all projects, different parties have different knowledge 
and perceptions of the nature of sources of uncertainty and different capabilities for their 
management (Chapman & Ward, 2003). Graham and Gabriel (2003) state that stakeholders’ 
management needs to be continuously elaborated and converted into tactical actions by the 
project core team. After developing the list of stakeholders, the next important step is to consider 
why these individuals support the project by asking how they will benefit from a successful 
project. Yang et al. (2010) proposed their own approach to effective methods for successful 
stakeholder management, which is presented in Appendix B. Authors made an analysis of the 
most effective and frequently used methods by managers for identifying and estimating 
stakeholders, gathering information, making and implementing these decisions.  
 
They have found out that personal past experience, meetings, negotiations, focus groups and 
workshops, “snowball sampling”, i.e. asking the obvious/identified stakeholders to identify 
others of importance, called, is also considered very effective (Patton, 1990),  and intuition 
(Chinyio & Akintoye, 2008) are among the most effective methods in stakeholders’ 
management. However, “choice of approaches will depend on the purpose of the stakeholder 
analysis, the skills and resources of the investigating team, and the level of engagement” (Reed 
et al., 2009). Every party has its influence on the project’s objectives: cost, time, quality, safety 
and environment. The influence will be individual for every single project, since different 
stakeholders have different impact on the project realization. Thus, it will be interesting to 
investigate how different stakeholders influence the project objects in different contexts.  
 
a) Role of trust in managing uncertainties associated with project parties 
 
Many authors include trust as a way to reduce uncertainty in the projects. There are different 
types of trust in projects: trust to insight and outside parties. A main problem is that a project 
context is more temporary than ongoing operations where reutilization, learning from past 
experiences, memory of past experiences is easier (more available), the parties are relatively 
constant, and experimenting and the development of optimum practice is possible (Ward, 2002).  
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In our case there are necessitates of involvement of outside parties, who may be unfamiliar to the 
project owner. Such new and temporary relationships increase the importance of trust, since 
project parties may have little or no prior knowledge of the other parties’ technical or fiduciary 
standards, and there is a lack of time for familiarity to develop from shared experiences or 
demonstrations of non exploitation of vulnerability (Atkinson, 2006).  
 
A further problem is that total control over the activities of project parties is neither possible nor 
desirable. An understandable reliance on controls can lead project staff to feel that they are not 
trusted (and vice versa), and this can have adverse consequences of a moral hazard nature. The 
problem with trust is that it can spiral, both positively and negatively (Coopey, 2002), as a result 
there is always the equilibrium to be struck between the use of controls and trust. Handy (1998) 
argues that where you cannot trust, you have to check all the systems of control involved, to 
ensure that any gaps in trust are replaced with controls.  
 
2.2.3 Uncertainties associated with stages in the project life cycle 
 
Many significant sources of uncertainty that need to be managed in projects are associated with 
project life cycle (PLC) (Atkinson & Crawford, 2006). The PLC refers to a logical sequence of 
activities to accomplish the project’s goals. Regardless of scope or complexity, any project goes 
through a series of stages during its life (Fig. 2.3): 1 – Initiation, 2 – Planning, 3 – Executing, 4 – 
Monitoring and Controlling, 5 – Closing a project.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.3 Projects Life Cycle Time 
Staffing 
level 
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The first is Initiation or Birth phase, in which the outputs and critical success factors are defined, 
followed by a Planning phase, characterized by breaking down the project into smaller 
parts/tasks, an Execution phase, in which the project plan is executed, and lastly a Closure or 
Exit phase, that marks the completion of the project. The Graph above shows us that staffing 
level, i.e. people involved in the project, increases steadily until the last stages of the PLC. Not 
all the projects will visit every stage before they reach completion. Some projects do not follow a 
planning and/or monitoring stage. Some projects, for example, will go through steps 2, 3 and 4 
multiple times. There is a principle in PM that stakeholders influence, risk and uncertainty go 
down with the project’s time, but the costs of changes are increasing steadily (Fig. 2.4 illustrates 
this dependency). Thus, it is important to have a very strong management planning and control 
on the earlier stages of the PLC and during the whole project’s realization. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.4 Impact of variable based on project time (PMBOK, 2008) 
 
Worth to notice, that stakeholders’ influence, risk and uncertainty are greatest at the start of the 
project. These factors decrease over the PLC. Ability to influence the final characteristics of the 
project’s product, without significantly impacting cost, is higher at the start of the project and 
decreases at the end. Diverse MC tools and methodologies prevail in the different PLC’s phases 
(Lock, 2008, Turner, 2006, PMBOK, 2008). Each stage of PLC is connected with different 
uncertainties. A widespread challenge in projects is to have the design and plan stages carefully 
enough, because a project could pass through to execution stage with scarcity of required 
High  
 
 
Degree of 
influence 
the 
project  
 
 
 
Low  
Project Time 
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specifications for production (for example technical details). During execution this gives rise to 
difficulties necessitating additional design development and production planning, and 
consequently adverse effects on the performance criteria of cost, time and quality (Atkinson, 
2006). This problem is mostly significant when stakeholders are trying to oblige difficult for 
realization, practically unrealistic milestones dates and budget bounds.  
 
Sometimes this can be caused by politically motivated performance criteria, targets, and 
operating constraints: e.g. budgets too small to allow adequate resources to complete the project 
by a stated time, or to a given level of functionality (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). In the design stage 
of the PLC the nature of the project deliverable and the process for producing it are fundamental 
uncertainties (Ward, 2003). The allocate stage of the PLC is an important part which is 
connected with decisions on structure of the project, recognition of suitable suppliers and 
employees involved in work, and allocation of tasks between them (Atkinson, 2006).  
 
In principle, much of this uncertainty is removed in pre-execution stages by attempting to specify 
what is to be done, how, when, and by whom, at what cost. In practice, significant amount of this 
uncertainty may remain unresolved through much of the PLC (Chapman, 2003). Very often 
execution stage faces uncertainty when there are some design changes (Christensen, 1998). 
Changes may have wider technical implications than first thought, leading to subsequent disputes 
between client and contractor about liability for costs and consequential delays (Williams et al., 
1995). In the plan stage, looking forward to the deliver and support stages, and developing 
appropriate responses for key sources of uncertainty, can reduce or eliminate potential later 
problems at relatively low cost. The key here is identifying which issues need this attention in 
the plan stage, and which do not (Atkinson, 2006). 
 
2.3 Management control and management control systems  
 
Control is that element of a project that keeps it on-track, on-time and within budget (Lewis, 
2000), it begins early in the project with planning and ends late in the project with post-
implementation review. Control helps to define and manage uncertainties. Each project should 
be assessed for the appropriate level of control needed: too much control is too time-consuming, 
too little control – is very risky. Project deviation occurs because known potential threats are not 
adequately solved or the threats are unknown or overlooked. Project managers’ decisions on risk 
are therewith the nexuses of MC.  
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MCS is a system which gathers and uses information to evaluate the performance of different 
organizational resources like human, physical, financial and also the organization as a whole 
considering the organizational strategies. Anthony (2007) defined MC is the process by which 
managers influence other members of the organization to implement the organization’s 
strategies. MCS are tools to aid management for steering an organization toward its strategic 
objectives and competitive advantage. Thus, MC is concerned with coordination, resource 
allocation, motivation, and performance measurement, mainly based on management accounting. 
Second, it involves resource allocation decisions and is therefore related to and requires 
contribution from economics especially managerial economics. Third, it involves 
communication, and motivation which means it is related to and must draw contributions from 
social psychology especially organizational behaviour (Maciariello & Kirby, 1994).  
 
MC in project management is exercised through monitoring, reporting and forecasting the 
output, comparing this to the project objectives and sending corrective signals to the input of 
data and resources (Figure 2.5.). The output is made to conform closely to the objectives. MCS 
are needed for cost, risk, quality, communication, time, change, procurement, and human 
resources (Räisänen & Linde, 2004). The growing tendency to reduce inefficiency and to 
alleviate managerial uncertainty pushes organizational designers to introduce higher levels of 
control and a growing bureaucratization of PM (Räisänen and Linde, 2004), which might be 
counter-productive. 
 
 
Fig. 2.5 Elements of the project control cycle (adapted from Wideman, 2010) 
Monitor against 
baseline plan 
(Organize)
Report deviations 
(Evaluate)
Apply corrective 
actions (Reward)
Update current 
project plan (Plan)
Objective 
Provide information to 
identify problem areas and 
initiate corrective action by 
applying: scope, schedule, 
cost and performance 
control 
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Characteristics and goals of MCS can be follows (Wideman, 2010): (i) facilitate detailed 
planning; (ii) be able to measure performance in relation to the plan and quickly report any 
deviations from the plan; (iii) be able to communicate planning and performance information to 
all parties involved; and (iv) identify objectives and highlight important operations leading to 
these objectives. Referring to MC, contingency and institutional frameworks claim that the 
design of MCS depends on the context of the organizational setting in which such controls are 
activated (Canonico & Söderlund, 2010; Mellemvik et al., 1988; Otley, 1999; Scott, 1995, etc.).  
 
2.3.1 Management control and its context  
 
According to Mellemvik et al. (1988, p. 104) accounting (and hence, management control) is a 
“language designed to reduce uncertainties”; it cannot be isolated from the social process 
operating in and around projects. The context of MC can be understood as a system, which 
consists of “accounting structures and processes” as a constituent of MCS, which in turn being a 
broader definition, includes “other organizational structures and processes” as well (see Fig. 2.6). 
Thus, the context of MC consists of structures and processes both within the project (I will call it 
internal context) and outside it, in its environment (correspondently external context). Other 
MCS, structures and processes are obtained on the intersection of external and internal contexts 
of the project.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.6 MC and its context (adapted from Mellemvik et al., 1988) 
 
From the theoretical perspective, MCS in different countries (contexts) will differ significantly 
due to the differences in environment of the projects, both external and internal. Let’s provide 
some support arguments to this statement. There is substantial evidence that firms in different 
types of economies react differently to similar challenges (Knetter, 1989). Institutional theory 
The project  
Accounting structures 
and processes as a 
constituent of MCS 
Other MCS, 
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states that design of MCS is dependent upon the rules and belief systems prevailing in the 
environment (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Mellemvik et al. (1988) 
and Macintosh (1985) consider that information gathering and interpretation techniques vary 
between actors according to their personalities and cognitive style, which could be different in 
different countries. The size of the project also influences the choice of MC tools and systems. 
We may find an argument in Chenhall (2003) that large organizations associated with more 
formal, traditional MCS (e.g. budgets, formal communication, sophisticated controls) and vice 
versa.  
 
In my research I do analyse MCS of big (international) construction projects in two different 
countries. According to contingency theory these projects are utilize more formal MCS, first of 
all budgets and formal communications. According to institutional theory, construction industry 
in another country may have different instances of the same institutions, local rules, contracting 
practices, etc., which lead to different taken-for-granted regularities of behaviour, and hence, use 
of different MCS. For comparing big construction projects with varying institutional 
environments I have to take into account also diverse pressures in global and home institutional 
environments, e.g. global and local building standards, and human resource management 
practices (Rosenzweig and Singh, 1991; Zaheer, 1995). Summing up all above mentioned I 
would suggest that many uncertainties in big construction projects could be caused by the 
institutional environment (e.g. building codes and practices, governmental regulation, etc.) and 
due to some contingent parameters (e.g. size of the project, its strategy, etc.). Levitt & 
Mahalingam (2007) identified the following six factors that can cause uncertainties in PM in 
different contexts during the PLC: problems due to different information gathering techniques; 
delays due to conflicting aesthetic views; problems due to differences in building codes; 
problems due to differences in available building materials; delays due to differences in 
contracting practices; and delays due to differences in regulations. 
 
Institutional theory does not provide the answers in terms of defining management tools for 
managing risks and uncertainties in the big construction projects, but understanding institutional 
differences and possible problems give us a good background for comparison two big 
construction projects within two different contexts.  
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2.3.2 Legal, cultural, economic, and political environments of the international 
projects  
 
Miroshnik (2002) defines legal, cultural, economic, and political factors as the main constituents 
of the context of MC of international project. Legal environment includes legal tradition, 
effectiveness of legal system, treaties with foreign nations, laws effecting business, etc. Cultural 
environment consist of customs, norms, languages, attitudes, motivations, social institutions, 
status symbols, religion. Economic environment has in it such factors as level of economic 
development, population, education, infrastructure, natural resources, climate, membership in 
regional economic blocks, monetary and fiscal policies, nature of competition, wage and salary 
levels, etc. Political environment includes stability and form of the government, foreign policy 
social unrest, government attitude towards foreign firms and so forth.  
 
Miroshnik (2002) states that managers should be continuously monitoring the environmental 
variables in the countries involved, especially those that may have a significant positive or 
negative impact. She adds also that the economic, political and physical environments 
(population, geography, etc.) are important issues in big international projects. However, cultural 
environment (communications, religions, values and ideologies, education, social structure, etc.) 
has a special importance (Miroshnik, 2002). Different cultural environments require different 
managerial behaviours. “Strategies, structures and technologies which are appropriate in one 
cultural setting may lead to failure in another. Managing relations between multicultural 
organizations and cultural environment is thus a matter of accurate perception, diagnosis and 
appropriate adaptation” (Miroshnik, 2002).  
 
Thus, within the concept of an organization as a culture, it is sensible to recognize the possibility 
and likelihood of distinct subcultures existing among managerial teams, members of different 
social classes and so on. Moreover, cultures in organizations are not independent of their social 
context (Dent, 1991) and ways of managing uncertainties are also vary (Miroshnik, 2002).  Thus, 
accounting and management control systems are likely to be differentially implicated in different 
countries (Harrison & McKinnon, 1999), such as Ukraine and Norway. They may embody 
different assumptions about organizations, leadership and power displays, reward systems, 
rationality, authority, communications, respect for individuals and friendliness and socialization 
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process in the projects, perception of time, space and so forth (House et al., 1999; Ashkanasy et 
al., 2000; Miroshnik, 2002).   
 
2.3.3 Diagnostic, belief, interactive and boundary controls  
 
Control mechanisms refer, in Simons’ view, to “the formal, information-based routines and 
procedures managers use to maintain or alter patterns in organizational activities” (Simons, 
1994). MC is primarily achieved by the use and combination of four ‘levers of control’: (1) 
beliefs systems, (2) boundary systems, (3) diagnostic systems, and (4) interactive systems. 
Beliefs systems are formal systems used by top managers to define, communicate, and reinforce 
the basic values, purpose, and direction for the organization. Belief systems are created and 
communicated through formal documents such as credos, mission statements, and statements of 
purpose (Simons, 1994). Belief systems are thereby expected to contain references to core 
values, to performance levels, and to the modalities through which the individuals should handle 
relationships both internally and externally. Typically, belief systems are instantiated through 
formal documents, such as mission and corporate statements. They are generally used to 
empower and commit individuals to organizational objectives and to show directions on how to 
search for new opportunities. 
 
Boundary systems are formal systems used by top managers to establish explicit limits and rules 
which must be respected (Simons, 1994). They set the boundaries of corporate strategy and 
tactics. They are intended to constrain the degree of freedom of managers, and as a result should 
focus the creativity on relevant issues. They are usually stated in negative terms, i.e. penalties on 
misbehaviour. They are meant to contain cost escalations and their existence allows top 
management to delegate decision-making. When boundary systems are excessive for a particular 
organization, they end up slowing down the pace of adaptation to exogenous changes and 
environmental conditions (Canonico & Söderlund, 2010). 
 
Diagnostic control systems are the formal feedback systems used to monitor organizational 
outcomes and correct deviations from preset standards of performance (Simons, 1994, p.170). 
Diagnostic control systems are instantiated through business plans and budgets. They represent 
tools available to top management in order to monitor and evaluate business results. Their data 
are expected to be accurate. Their rationality lies in the argument that evaluation of business 
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processes and results improves the allocation of resources and improves motivation. Such 
systems are also used to measure output variables, performances, and strategies adopted by the 
organization (Peljhan and Tekavčič, 2006). 
 
Interactive control systems are formal systems used by top managers to regularly and personally 
involve themselves in the decision activities of subordinates (Simons, 1994). They help in 
focusing attention on particular issues, creating dialogue, and stimulating learning, facilitating 
new ideas and strategies to emerge in response to opportunities or threats in the competitive 
environment. Their data are provided by underlying systems and available regularly to top 
management. Their use requires an organizational climate that encourages openness and accepts 
constructive criticism and debate. The use of interactive control systems is called for when 
organizations face strategic uncertainties, requiring opportunity-seeking behaviour (Canonico & 
Söderlund, 2010). Table 2.3 shows us the main logic of control underlying each of Simons’ 
levers, applied for projects.  
 
Table 2.3 Control levers in project management (adapted from 
Canonico & Söderlund, 2010) 
 
 Belief 
systems 
Boundary 
systems 
Diagnostic 
systems 
Interactive 
systems 
Main 
control 
mechanisms 
Control is enabled 
by committing 
workers to 
organizational 
objectives  
Control is enabled 
by constraining the 
degree of freedom 
of managers  
Control is enabled 
by monitoring and 
evaluating projects 
progression and 
results  
Control is enabled 
by working 
proximity and 
proactive decision 
making  
Peculiarity 
in PM 
May promote or 
hinder explorative 
bottom-up 
behaviour at single 
project level 
Avoid the risks that 
projects shift 
towards external 
logistics  
Allow comparison 
in terms of 
measures of 
efficiency and 
effectiveness 
Create an internal 
discussion arena 
among a variety of 
project managers on 
strategic issues  
Critical 
issues in 
PM 
Projects may prove 
to be heterogeneous 
and could require 
different attitudes 
towards beliefs  
May lose the 
potential cross-
fertilization across 
phases 
Do not provide a 
representation of 
projects 
interdependencies  
May be difficult to 
manage when 
number of current 
operations is high, 
could tend to 
escalade 
 
Thus, belief systems relate to the fundamental values of the projects. Boundary systems describe 
constraints in terms of employee behaviour, i.e., forbidden actions. Interactive systems focus on 
communicating and implementing the project’s strategy. The purpose of an interactive system is 
to promote debate related to the assumptions underlying the organization's strategy and 
ultimately to promote learning and growth. 
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MAIN THEORETICAL FINDINGS 
 
Despite a myriad of studies on project management, manageability problems in the big 
construction projects persist. This chapter reports on a study on how uncertainties can be 
understood and managed in big construction projects in different contexts. I conclude that 
uncertainty is an event that cannot be foreseen in advance deriving from the lack of knowledge, 
and projects are unique endeavours that produce a set of deliverables within clearly specified 
time, cost, quality constraints, etc. Projects are not repetitive in nature, have defined timescale, 
limited resources, approved budget, involve uncertainties and are targeted towards achieving 
beneficial change. Based on the theory presented earlier in the chapter I can figure out the 
following types of uncertainties and ways of managing them (Table 2.4).  
 
Table 2.4 Main theoretical findings in regard to projects’ uncertainties 
and ways of managing them 
 
Types of Uncertainties Tools to Manage Uncertainties 
 Uncertainties in estimates  - Identify main features and limitations of the project as well as a 
type of the project (tools to be used will depend on them); 
- Using organizational capabilities; 
- Building organizational culture; 
- Using knowledge management; 
- Learning by experience. 
 Uncertainties associated 
with project parties 
- Trust, or controls, or the equilibrium between the use of controls 
and trust; 
- Continuous updating and gathering information about 
stakeholders / Learning by doing ;  
- Snowball sampling, focus group meetings, meetings and 
workshops, intuition; 
- Negotiations/communication with stakeholders;   
- Analyzing uncertainty associated with project parties: (i) the 
trustful environment, (ii) the monitoring environment, (iii) the 
negotiating environment and (iv) the circumscribed 
environment 
 Uncertainties associated 
with stages in the project 
life cycle 
- Stakeholders influence, uncertainties go down with the project 
time, but the costs of changes are increasing steadily;  
- Important to have a very strong management planning in the 
beginning and strong MC during the whole project’s realization. 
- For uncertainty management PLC can be decomposed on 
smaller processes and steps  
 
Referring to MCS, contingency frameworks claim that the design of control systems depends on 
the context of the organizational setting in which such controls are activated (Camprieu, 2007; 
Chenhall, 2003; Otley, 1980, etc.). Institutional theory in tern “prepares a strong basis” for 
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understanding institutional differences (economical, political, cultural, etc.) in the PM in 
different contexts. Cultural environment is conceived to have a special importance in designing 
MCS in big (international) projects. Different cultural environments require different managerial 
approaches for managing uncertainties, because they embody different assumptions about 
organizations, leadership and power displays, reward systems, etc. (House et al., 1999; 
Ashkanasy et al., 2000; Miroshnik, 2002).  Thus, MCS are likely to be differentially implicated 
in different countries (Harrison & McKinnon, 1999), such as Ukraine and Norway. In the 
empirical and analytical parts I use following model, developed for analysing and comparing two 
different contexts of PM: Norwegian and Ukrainian (Fig. 2.7).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.7 Components of management control in two contexts 
 
Big construction projects, having their strict constrains in terms of costs, time and scope, which 
are the main objectives of the projects at the same time, face many uncertainties that could be 
grouped into: 1) uncertainties in estimates, 2) uncertainties related to the project parties and 2) 
uncertainties associated with stages of PLC. The sources and types of uncertainties are 
dependent upon the context in which unique projects are realized. All these parameters in tern 
affect the design of MCS, used for handling uncertainties related to three above mentioned 
groups.  
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III. METHODOLOGICAL PART 
 
“The questions that researchers ask in their projects are in turn affected by the philosophical 
assumptions that underline the way they see the world”  
Easterby-Smith, 2008 
 
The topic and the aim of research affect the method or the combination of methods researcher 
chooses for conducting the research (Johnson & Duberley, 2006). This chapter is written to give 
an overview of the research methods and data gathering techniques employed during the 
research. In attempting to reach the goal of my research, I employed qualitative analysis as a 
major tool for collecting and analysing data. I can use qualitative analysis when “we wish to 
understand meanings, look at, describe and understand experience, ideas, beliefs and values” 
(Holliday, 2007). The chapter ends with consideration of validity and reliability issues 
concerning obtaining and interpretation of the empirical data. Some obstacles of my research are 
also mentioned in the end of the chapter. 
 
3.1 Timeframe of the research  
 
Previously prescribed work schedule is very important part of management and management 
research in particular. The timeframe of the research covers a period from January 2011 until 
May 2011. While doing my research I passed through the following stages (adapted from 
Gubrium, Holstein, 2002): thematizing, designing, interviewing, transcribing, analysing, 
verifying and reporting.  
 
Table 3.1 examines the description of the main stages of doing my research. The biggest 
difficulty of the research was to get into the contact with respondents, which are very busy 
people, and to receive their consents to be interviewed. This stage of the research obtained to be 
one of the most time-consuming and complicated. Thematizing and designing was also 
challenging, because the projects under study and respondents were changed several times. It 
influenced the topic and vector of the research, and consequently theoretical frame of references 
and methods used for conducting research.  
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Table 3.1 Schedule and the main steps of MOPP 
 
No. Period Results Stage 
1 10-25.01.2011 Choosing a topic and research questions 
Th
em
at
iz
in
g 
&
 
D
es
ig
n
in
g 
2 
26.01.2011 
1st MOPP seminar, defending the MOPP’s proposal, 
discussing the topic, research question and methodology of 
the research 
3 28.01.2011 Delivering the 1
st
 Work Requirement 
4 
29.01.2011- 
22.03.2011 
 Taking into consideration all remarks and comments from 
the advisors, correcting; 
 Getting the contact with respondents; 
 Preparing the topics for conversation with my respondents; 
 Reformulation of the research question and discussion 
about my research strategy and methodology, searching for 
relevant theory,  
 Writing Theoretical and Methodological chapters. 
5 23.03.2011 2
nd
 MOPP seminar, delivering the 2nd Work Requirement   
6 
31.03.2011-
28.04.2011 
 Conducting the interviews with my respondents, receiving 
the feedback, rewriting the earlier draft; 
 Analysing the legal base and documents, surveys, etc., 
writing empirical and analytical chapters of MOPP. 
In
te
rv
ie
w
in
g,
 
tr
an
sc
rib
in
g,
 
an
al
ys
in
g,
 
v
er
ify
in
g 
 
7 29.04.2011 3
rd
 MOPP seminar, delivering the tentative paper 
8 30.04.2011-
04.05.2011 
Taking into consideration all remarks and comments from 
the advisors, correcting, rewriting  
9 06.05.2011 Meeting with scientific advisor Reporting 
10 07-18.05.2011 Final remarks 
11 19.05.2011 Delivering the MOPP 
 
The topic, research questions, methods, main findings, etc. were discussed with Management 
Control course lecturers from Bodø Graduate School of Business during the MOPP seminars and 
with scientific advisor, which greatly helped to clarify the vector of the research. The course 
literature and lectures from “Research Methods” gave me an opportunity to choose research 
methodology and to cope with a huge amount of data obtained. 
 
3.2 Thematizing & Designing  
 
The first and very important step in doing research is choosing a topic and defining objects of the 
research. Researchers have to know exactly what are they going to study and how? What 
methods can be applied to receive the information and answers needed, etc.? Thus, first I should 
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discuss briefly my research topic and research questions development, and then describe 
philosophical position, strategy and data gathering and analysing techniques used for doing my 
investigation.  
 
3.3 The research question development  
 
Every research starts with the developing of the problem statement and research questions. This 
step is crucial, because it gives focus, sets boundaries, and provides directions for the future 
work. Besides it will help for better understanding of what is the aim of the research and what we 
want to achieve. The problem statement of my work is: How are uncertainties being managed in 
big construction projects in different contexts? I provide a comparative study of the big 
construction projects in Ukraine and Norway. It worth to notice, that research topic comes from 
the certain problem or/and from the field that is interesting to a researcher. Problematic of my 
work lies in the specifics of management of the big projects. This field was chosen because of 
the personal interest of the author, current topicality and relevance. After choosing the main 
subject of the research, it is important to make it narrower and to focus on specific research 
problems. This step requires monitoring of existing theory and imagination to find out what is 
really interesting for you. In our case the research problem and the sphere of interests is 
fundamental risks and uncertainties that big projects face.  
 
Most research problems are difficult to solve without breaking them down into smaller tasks. 
Decomposition of something big into smaller tasks, i.e. several sub-questions, helps to control 
the final result. The sub-questions of my work are: (1) What are major uncertainties in relation to 
construction projects in Ukraine and Norway? How are they managed? (2) What are the 
differences and similarities between management control systems in handling uncertainties in 
construction projects in Norway and Ukraine? These research sub-questions are relevant to the 
problem statement and may help me to design the research and to reach the goals of the study.  
  
3.4 Philosophical position 
 
Researchers need to be aware of their own philosophical assumptions (Easterby-Smith, 2008), 
thus to write a research it is important to define a philosophical position. All philosophical 
positions and their attendant methodologies, explicitly or implicitly, hold a view about social 
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reality. Easterby-Smith (2008) identifies two opposing theoretical attitudes to the nature of social 
entities: positivism and social constructionism. Positivism is a belief that social phenomena and 
their meanings have an existence that is not dependent on social actors. They are facts that have 
an independent existence. Social constructionism is a belief that social phenomena are in a 
constant state of change because they are totally reliant on social interactions as they take place. 
Even the account of researchers is subject to these interactions, therefore social knowledge can 
only be inter-determinate (Walliman, 2006).  
 
In most cases philosophical position cannot be define as pure positivism or social 
constructionism. Very often researchers use a combination of different techniques in order to 
reach the goal of the research. My philosophical position is closer to the social constructionism, 
which characterises by following factors (see Table 3.2). According to Easterby-Smith (2008) 
the task of the social constructivism scientist should not to be to gather facts and measure how 
often certain patterns occur, but to appreciate the different constructions and meanings that 
people place upon their experience. The main technique of social constructionism is 
conversation, by which researcher receives an understanding of the problem. 
 
Table 3.2 Philosophical position (adapted from Easterby-Smith, 2008) 
 
Criteria  Social constructionism 
The observer  - Is involved of what is being observed  
Human interests  - Are the main drivers of science  
Explanations  - Aim to increase general understanding of the situation 
Research progress through - Gathering data from which ideas are included 
Concepts  - Should incorporate stakeholder perspective  
Units of analysis  - May include the complexity of “whole” situation  
Generalization through  - Theoretical abstraction 
Sampling requires  - Small numbers of cases chosen for specific reason 
 
Due to the philosophical position I can define research strategy: being involved in the active 
research, I gather data using the small number of cases chosen for this purpose (one big 
construction project is in Norway, and the second one – is in Ukraine). Research topic is 
observed in different contexts. Therefore, different factors will have different impact on the 
research projects. Starting a research I have to be aware about possible strengths and weaknesses 
of the chosen approach. According to Easterby-Smith (2008) the social constructionist paradigm 
has strengths in the ability to look at how processes change over time, to understand people’s 
meanings, to adjust to new issues and ideas as they emerge, and to contribute to the evolution of 
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new theories. They also provide a way of gathering data which is seen as natural rather than 
artificial. However, there are significant challenges and weaknesses of social constructionism 
research paradigm. Data collection can be very time consuming, the analysis and interpretations 
of data may be very difficult, depending on the intimate, tacit knowledge of the researchers, and 
the results of the research may not have credibility with policy makers. Therefore, I pay lots of 
attention for preparing interviews and verifying the results obtained during the research.  
 
3.5 Research design 
 
There are different ways to design a research: explorative, descriptive and causal. Explorative is 
a type of research conducted for a problem that has not been clearly defined (Mitchell, Jolley, 
2007). Exploratory research often relies on secondary research such as reviewing available 
literature and data, and qualitative approaches such as in-depth interviews. The results of 
exploratory research are not usually useful for decision-making by themselves, but they can 
provide significant insight into a given situation, and “perform some indication as to the “why”, 
“how” and “when” (Mason, 2004). The main disadvantage of this approach is that it is not 
typically generalizable to the population at large. Another type of research design is descriptive, 
which describes data and characteristics about the phenomenon being studied. Descriptive 
research answers the questions who, what, where, when and how, and often implicates a survey 
investigation. Although the data description is factual, accurate and systematic, the research 
cannot describe what caused a situation (Mitchell, Jolley, 2007).  
 
Thus, the research design is conceived as explorative with descriptive elements as well. In order 
to provide an analysis of the big projects in two contexts, I need to have direct access to the 
organizations to collect primary data and to get the knowledge about the components of the 
MCS.  Therefore, empirical data are mainly obtained by qualitative analysis, and notably from 
the interviews with key figures of construction of “Donbass Arena” (Donetsk, Ukraine) and 
“Holmenkollen” (Oslo, Norway). I conducted personal and telephone interviews with my 
respondents. Telephone and Internet technologies were used for setting up the dates for 
conducting interviews, getting a feedback and approving the information received during the 
interviews (e-mails, telephone calls).  
 
My work is based on a comparative study. The examination of two or more contrasting cases can 
be used to highlight differences and similarities between them, leading to a better understanding 
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of social phenomena (Onuchak, 2009). Comparative research is commonly applied in cross-
cultural and cross-national contexts (Walliman, 2006). Research focuses on two different 
contexts: cross-national and cross-cultural. Cross-national is because I compare project realized 
in two countries: Ukraine and Norway. Each country has its own specifics and characteristics. 
From the other side it is possible to say that my research is cross-cultural, because the 
phenomenon of project management has different history and different ways of development in 
both countries. Moreover, big construction projects involve a lot of parties from many countries. 
Thus, it gives us an opportunity to say that there will be differences in the project management of 
both countries: different systems of decision-making, management control, etc. As an approach 
to make a research I have chosen a case study. It has its own distinct features. Case studies are 
often described as an exploration of a “bounded system”. The object of the case could therefore 
be many things – for example, a community, an institution, an individual, an activity or an event. 
Case studies are often associated with ethnography where the purpose is to describe and interpret 
social groups in their natural setting using a number of qualitative techniques over extended 
period of time (Onuchak, 2009).  
 
There are many argues about the term of “bounded system”, as it is difficult to define the 
boundaries of the study in case of space and time. Indeed, social systems are rarely bounded and, 
where they are, such boundaries are often constructed by the participants or researcher 
(Atkinson, 1996). Case studies are considered particularly valuable where the research context is 
too complex for experimental or survey research. Although a valid research strategy in its own 
right, case studies may be used to supplement other research methods including quantitative 
techniques – for example to generate theories before such theories are tested in the main study or 
to provide details that enable researchers to expand on quantitative findings (Miller, 2003).  
 
3.6 Data collection and analysis  
 
“Qualitative inquiry cultivates the most useful of all human capacities – the capacity to learn 
from others”,  
From Halcolm’s Evaluation Laws (Patton, 1990) 
 
As I have already mentioned, my work is based on the qualitative research. Qualitative 
techniques rely on language and the interpretation of its meaning, so data collection methods 
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tend to involve close human involvement and a creative process of theory development rather 
than testing (Walliman, 2006). A qualitative research may be generally defined as a study, which 
is conducted in a natural setting where the researcher, an instrument of data collection, gathers 
words or pictures, analyzes them, focuses on the meaning of participants, and describes a process 
that is both expressive and persuasive in language (Creswell, 1998). Qualitative methods consist 
of three kinds of data collection (Patton, 1990): (1) in-depth, open-ended interviews; (2) direct 
observation; and (3) written documents.  
 
Due to the fact that we are students, I cannot use direct observation, however I can use 
interviews as a source of data for my research and analyse written documents. The data from 
interviews consist of direct quotations from people about their experience, opinions, knowledge 
according to the topic and compose the primary data of my research. Document analysis yields 
project documentation, experts records, official publications, reports, standards, laws, etc. 
 
3.6.1 Primary data  
 
Qualitative interviewing is seen as the major source for obtaining data in the research. Through 
qualitative interviews you can understand experiences and reconstruct events in which you did 
not participate (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). Qualitative interviewing is based on conversation, with 
the emphasis on researchers asking questions and listening, and respondents answering. The 
epistemology of the qualitative interview tends to be more constructionist than positivist 
(Gubrium, Holstein, 2002).  In this work semi-structured and open-ended interviews are seemed 
to be the best way to acquire primary information (see Table 3.3).  
 
Table 3.3 Types of interview (Easterby-Smith, 2008) 
Level of structure Type of interview 
Highly structured Market research interview 
Semi-structured* Guided open interview* 
Unstructured  Ethnography  
* - I used for conducting the interview 
 
Mead & Schutz note that in-depth interviewers seek an inter-subjective bridge between 
themselves and their respondent to allow them to imaginatively share (and subsequently 
describe) their respondent’s world. This inter-subjective bridge may be found and crossed, 
allegedly, with the help of particular interview techniques – expressing empathy, asking open-
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ended questions, pausing to allow respondents to elaborate, and so on (Onuchak, 2009). 
Interviewer should offer various kinds of explanations – explanations of the project, explanations 
for the recording of the interview, explanations for why the interviewer is seeking native 
language terms or argot, and explanations for particular questions or a particular line of 
questioning (Miller, 2003).  
 
3.6.2 Argumentation in support to the projects’ choice 
 
For the interviews I have chosen respondents worked under two big construction projects: one is 
in Norway (Holmenkollen ski arena), another – in Ukraine (stadium Donbass Arena). There are 
several reasons for choosing the Holmenkollen and Donbass Arena projects as units (objects) of 
my research. These projects are similar in many ways. First of all, they both are unique, complex 
and do not have any analogues in the countries studied. New construction techniques, new 
architectural solutions, new construction materials were used in both projects. These two projects 
have been realized in the same industry – sport industry, with almost the same constrains and big 
pressure of stakeholders. They both were constructed for the big sporting events and became the 
local symbols of these regions. Other similarity is in a huge number of multinational contractors 
and sub-contractors of the projects. The projects are interesting and “fresh”, i.e. they have not 
been studied much5, because they were finished recently.  
 
That is why projects, chosen for my analysis, seem to be interesting in terms of similarities of 
unit of research and clusters in which they operate (big construction projects in sport sector). 
Table 3.4 gives some information supporting the choice of observable units.  Norwegian project 
has been finished and set in operation in February 2011. Any final reports are not still prepared 
and any official information about the project is not published yet. Some secondary data is now 
available on Internet (it is, primarily, political speeches, materials from the press-conferences 
and other publications in media in Norwegian). The Ukrainian project has been started earlier, 
than Norwegian one, and it was finished in August 2009. Secondary data about the project is 
now available on the official web-site of Donbass Arena (in English) and in some thematic 
periodicals (in Russian and Ukrainian).  
  
                                                 
5
 My “Holmenkollen” respondents mentioned that I was the first student studying risks and uncertainties of the 
project. Regarding “Donbass Arena” my respondent Sergey Isakov, project manager, said that there were some 
interviews regarding my topic, but they are not published yet.  
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Table 3.4 Information about projects 
 
Factors Holmenkollen Donbass Arena 
Industry  Sport  
Contactors  More than 20 Around 15  
Terms of realization  Around 3 years  
Costs  USD 370 mln USD 400 mln 
 
The final costs of both projects exceeded the planned ones more than twice (initially planned 
cost of Holmenkollen was –USD 125 mln, and the total planned costs of Donbass Arena – USD 
185 mln). However, both projects ended up with increased costs of the projects – USD 370 mln 
and USD 400 mln respectively. It emphasizes once more time, that the original plans were not 
met, or initial costs have been calculated incorrectly. The biggest difference of these two projects 
is that they have been realized in different countries with different situational factors and 
different institutional environment. Access to the persons involved in management of these two 
big construction projects and possibility of getting formal and informal information in regard to 
projects management and control were considered as important factors while choosing the topic 
and the objects of the research. 
 
3.6.3 More information about respondents 
 
Since I am not able to interview all the parties involved in the projects (because of the huge 
amount of stakeholders, and due to the time and cost constraints), I decided to focus on the main 
“figures” of the projects. I knew project manager of Donbass Arena and Director of 
Holmenkollen project beforehand, thus I used “snowball method” for getting into contact with 
other persons related to management of the projects. Johansen et al. (2004) explain “snowball 
method” as a method where the researcher tries to identify persons with a high degree of 
knowledge on a specific topic, and then ask them about other potential respondents of relevance. 
I asked above mentioned persons to help me to identify other people involved in management of 
the projects, who could share their experience with me, and they recommended a couple of 
persons for each project respectively. I conducted 6 interviews, 3 per each project (detailed 
information is in the Table 3.5).  
 
Interviews in Norway were conducted in English, while the project documents analysed were in 
Norwegian. Both languages are not native for the author of the paper. As for Ukrainian side, 
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interviews were conducted in Russian and English (with representative of Turkish company 
ENKA). It took time to translate all data obtained during the interviews.  
 
Interviews were primarily conducted personally, except of the interview with Director of 
construction of Donbass Arena – Ugur Koyunoglu. He was responsible for the project from the 
side of the main contractor – Turkish contractor company ENKA (Istanbul, Turkey). The 
telephone interview lasted approximately 1 hour. Other interviews were conducted personally 
and lasted approximately 1.5 hour. Interview with the Project Manager of Donbass Arena, Sergei 
Isakov, lasted 3.5 hours. I am grateful to my respondents that they have found time to share their 
experience with me.   
 
Table 3.5 Information about respondents 
 
Project  Respondents  Type of the 
interview 
Date/ Time/ Place 
 
 
H
o
lm
en
ko
lle
n
 
(O
slo
,
 
N
o
rw
ay
) 
Erik Øimoen – Director of the 
project of construction of 
Holmenkollen Ski Arena (Client 
Organization) 
Personal 
interview 
(English) 
Date: 31.03.2011 
Time: 14:00-15:30 
Place: Rådhus  
Florian Kosche – Main engineer of 
Holmenkollbakken 
 
Personal 
interview 
(English) 
Date: 04.03.2011 
Time: 17:00-18:15 
Place: Dipl. – Ing. Florian 
Kosche AS 
Hagbarth Vogt-Lorentzen – Project 
Manager of Holmenkollen Ski Arena 
Personal 
interview 
(English ) 
Date: 05.03.2011 
Time: 12:00-13:30 
Place: Terramar AS  
D
o
n
ba
ss
 
A
re
n
a
 
(D
o
n
et
sk
,
 
U
kr
ai
n
e) 
Sergei Isakov – Project Manager of 
construction of Donbass Arena 
Personal 
interview 
(Russian) 
Date: 08.04.2011 
Time: 8:30-12:00 
Place: Donbass Arena stadium  
Sergei Palkin – General Director of 
FC “Shakhtar” (Client Organization) 
 
Personal 
interview 
(Russian) 
Date: 12.04.2011 
Time: 10:00-11:15 
Place: FC Shakhtar office  
Ugur Koyunoglu – Director of 
construction of Donbass Arena 
(General contractor – Turkish 
company ENKA, Istanbul) 
Telephone 
interview 
(English) 
Date: 13.04.2011 
Time: 15:00-15:55 
 
 
 
For simplicity I will use shortened names of work statuses of interviewees in the next chapters:  
- Holmenkollen: Erik Øimoen – Director, Florian Kosche – Engineer, Hagbarth Vogt-
Lorentzen – Project Manager;  
- Donbass Arena: Sergey Isakov – Project Manager, Sergei Palkin – Director of FC 
“Shakhtar”, and Ugur Koyunoglu – General Contractor.  
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All respondents are experienced people that participated in managing another big and unique 
construction projects. Interviews with my respondents were subjected to the following topics for 
discussion: 
- Peculiarities of big projects (e.g., standards, stakeholders, limitations of the project, etc.); 
- Most important sources of risks and uncertainties in the project; 
- How these uncertainties were handled and by use of what kind of control tools? 
- What have you (and your team) learned from this project? 
 
Interview Guide (detailed questions for interviewer) which was used during conducting 
interviews is in Appendix C (English and Russian versions).  
 
3.6.4 Secondary data analysis 
 
In addition to the primarily data-gathering techniques, I can use several secondary and 
supplemental methods. For every qualitative research, data on a background and the context of 
the problem may be gathered. This may not be a major part of data collection, but at least 
researcher can receive a better understanding of the phenomena and its context. Analysing 
secondary data is seen as the tool to help to achieve a broader understanding of the research 
question and to maintain a reliability and validity of my research.  
 
Secondary data include both qualitative and quantitative data, and they can be used in both 
descriptive and explanatory researches. Within business and management research such data are 
used mostly in case study and survey-type research (Saunders et al, 2003). Qualitative data is 
more likely to describe decisions making processes in the study organization. For many research 
questions and objectives the main advantage of using secondary data is the enormous saving in 
resource, in particular time and money (Ghauri & Gronhaug, 2002). In general it is much less 
expensive to use secondary data than to collect data by yourself. Consequently, it is reasonable 
first to check secondary data available on the subject of master thesis.  
 
I started to look for the secondary data before obtaining primary data for the research. It gave me 
a general understanding about the projects environment and main stakeholders, but at the same 
time preliminary secondary data search showed insufficiency of data about risk management in 
big construction projects. I obtained secondary data from the official web-sites of the projects 
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and other Internet publications. The latter needs to be negotiated, obviously, secondary data in 
this case can be used as addition to primary data. However, there are some merits of using 
secondary data. Advantage of secondary data is that it is quickly obtained and provides a high 
quality of information (Steward and Kamins, 1993). Using secondary data within organizations 
may also have an advantage that, because they have already been collected, they provide an 
unobtrusive measure (Cowton, 1998). That is why obtaining secondary data when providing case 
study is appropriate. There are also disadvantages when using secondary data. First of all, it 
could be collected for the purpose that does not match the needs of the research (Saunders et al, 
2003). Thus, information from the official web-sites, documents and other written materials 
(textbooks, newspapers, e-mails, political speeches, etc.), earlier publications in the particular 
field was used as a secondary data for my research.  
 
3.7 Trustworthiness of the research: validity and reliability issues 
 
“Always be suspicious of data collection that goes according to plan” 
From Halcolm’s Evaluation Laws (Patton, 1990) 
 
The validity and reliability of quantitative data depend to a great extend on the methodological 
skills, sensitivity, and integrity of the researcher. Skilful interviewing involves much more than 
just asking questions (Patton, 1990). In qualitative inquiry ‘the researcher is the instrument’ 
(Patton, 1990). Understanding this I tried to provide the high level of validity and reliability of 
my master investigation, because if the collected data were not accurate, relevant and could not 
pertain to the topic, the research would be useless.  
 
A scale is reliable to the extent to which repeated applications of the scale produce the same 
results given that the attitudes remain the same (Riley et al, 2000). In a sense, reliability is about 
replication (being able to repeat and reproduce results). In connection with this I must be sure 
that data and conclusions derived on their basis are reliable. I used qualitative approach in my 
research in order to analyse how uncertainties are understood and managed in big construction 
projects in different contexts. For this purpose I investigated two different projects in two 
countries.  
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To assure the validity and reliability of the research, the topic, structure, methods and other 
elements of MOPP were discussed on every stage of the research. In order to create a reliable 
knowledge, people who worked directly with the project and use different methods of 
management control were interviewed. After interviewing and transcribing the materials of the 
conversations with my respondents, the main results obtained during interviews were typed on 
the paper and derived back to these persons for approval (via e-mails). Some of my respondents 
made certain corrections in the texts, others approved materials without any corrections. Thus, I 
can consider that reliability requirement was fulfilled. I support my opinions and results of the 
research by using quotations of the interviewees.  
 
Validity is about whether a measuring instrument actually measures what a researcher intends it 
to measure (Riley et al, 2000). In this respect data is derived from very competent people 
(project managers, directors, engineer of the project) working with projects directly and taking 
strategic decisions in their projects. This was critical factor for construct validity (Yin, 1994) 
assuring that we measure what we need to measure. However, during the conversations I faced 
the problems of different understanding of the same problems related to the projects and some 
concepts presented in the questions. For instance, most of my respondents do not accurately 
distinguish the concept of risk and the concept of uncertainty, which appear to be quite different 
from the academic point of view. Such problems were eliminated through discussion aiming to 
get common understanding of considered ideas. At the same time I used empirical findings of 
other researchers on the topic. It made possible to enlarge my understanding and look at the 
studied phenomena from different perspectives. Such broad scope of the study minimized a 
problem of subjectivity (Riley et al, 2000; Onuchak, 2009).  
 
Validity is concerned with the extent to which the measurement provides an accurate reflection 
of the concept (Johnson, Duberley, 2006). The issue of external validity (Yin, 1994) questions 
how wide and general the results can be used. In relation to this issue I concentrate my efforts on 
big construction projects in sport industry, and believe that results obtained can be generalized 
on a certain part of this sphere. As for internal validity, it questions if the conclusions derived 
correctly (Yin, 1994). Internal validity visualizes in the whole research process which we 
performed. Since I used different methods of research, gathering and analysing primary and 
secondary data, I used triangulation method to make the research narrower and more specific.  
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3.8 Obstacles and limitations of my research  
 
There are some difficulties I faced with during conducting a research. First and one of the most 
significant obstacles is problem of the right interpretation and translation, because “the data from 
interviews are words” (Patton, 1990). Thus, it is very important to interpret and translate the 
words correctly, because words can take on different meanings in different contexts. Marshall & 
Rossman (2006) describe issues with translating as following: “Especially in the use of 
interviews, translating text becomes increasingly salient issues in the discourse on qualitative 
research. The focus on generating accurate and meaningful data through translation processes is 
paramount”. Thus, during my research I faced the problem of translation. A lot of secondary data 
were in Norwegian, Russian and Ukrainian, but not English. Thus, it took additional time and 
efforts to translate secondary and primary data obtained into English. It was difficult also to 
translate correctly some professional terms and shoptalk. I overcome this challenge with the help 
of scientific advisor.  
 
This study has its limitations and further need for research. The empirical study was conducted 
in Norway and Ukraine, so the findings may mainly reflect the uncertainty management in these 
two regions. In future, similar studies should be conducted in other regions and other projects in 
the same countries to validate the main findings. Due to the projects complexities there is a need 
to conduct more interviews involved in the project. 
 
SUMMARY OF METHODOLOGY 
 
In this chapter I describe the main steps of my research, specified the main problems and 
limitations. I define my philosophical position as closer to the social constructionism. The 
research design is conceived as explorative with descriptive elements as well. The results of the 
research are represented as a comparative case study. Primarily data as well as the secondary 
data were used to get a broader understanding of the research question. Qualitative interviewing 
is seen as the major source for obtaining data in my research. In total, I conducted 6 interviews, 3 
per each project. To assure reliability and validity of the research I used different techniques. In 
this respect, for example, data was derived from competent people (project managers, directors, 
engineer of the project) working with projects directly and taking strategic decisions in their 
projects.  
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IV. EMPIRICAL PART 
 
To find out what are major uncertainties in relation to big construction projects in Ukraine and 
Norway and how are they managed, two cases will be used: the construction of Holmenkollen 
ski arena and elite football stadium Donbass Arena. In this chapter I observe the main features 
and limitations of the projects, I define main stakeholders, decision making schemes and 
organizational structures of the projects, because it is important to understand both external and 
internal environment of the projects. In the end of the chapters, I describe the systems of 
management controls based on Simon’s approach of four levers of control.  
 
This section is mainly based on interviews with experts both from Norway and Ukraine (three 
respondents per each project). The secondary data sources, like official web-sites, other 
publications are used in this section as well. The cases are described in connection to 
uncertainties that two projects faced with and ways of managing them. Worth to notice that term 
“uncertainty” was not used separately by my respondents. Norwegian interviewees used term 
“risks and uncertainties” together, while Ukrainian respondents were not accustomed to use term 
“uncertainty” at all. Instead, they used term “risks” or “problems”.  
 
4.1 NORWEGIAN CASE:  
“THE WORLD’S MOST MODERN SKI HILL” 
 
4.1.1 About Holmenkollen  
 
Holmenkollbakken is a large ski jumping hill located at Holmenkollen in Oslo, Norway. It has a 
capacity for 30,000 spectators. Since 1892 Holmenkollen has hosted many Ski Festivals, 
Olympics and World Championships. The hill has been rebuilt 19 times. In my work I 
investigate the time period from 2008 to 2011 when the entire structure was demolished and 
rebuilt. New modern infrastructure, required by FIS (International Ski Federation Standards), 
was also provided. Infrastructure includes communication, electrical and other systems in the 
whole Holmenkollen National Arena, which also consists of a combined cross-country skiing 
and biathlon stadium, and the normal hill Midtstubakken (“Faktaark om Holmenkollen”, 
Association for the Promotion of Skiing, 2011).  
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The six main spheres of the 
project are: 
- Temporary 
construction; 
- Electricity; 
- ICT; 
- Security;  
- Technical control;  
- Snow production.  
                                       
The hill is 375 meters 
above mean sea level. It 
includes: ski-simulator, 
three souvenir shops, and 
cafeteria. It is the only hill in the world with a permanent wind screen built as part of the 
designed construction, and the only steel jump in the world (Hagesæter, 2011). Demolition of 
Holmenkoll-bakken started in October 2008. “New” Holmenkollen was opened on the 3rd of 
March, 2010. However, many woks, especially related to infrastructure, were continued up to 
February 2011, when Norway hosted World Ski Championships-2011. The hill is the most 
popular tourist attraction in Norway, and has roughly one million visitors each year (Buzzi, 
2011).  
 
4.1.2 Project’s parties and project management organization 
 
The venue owner, investor and project’s initiator is Oslo Municipality. Skiing hill and the whole 
arena is operated by Ski forretningen, the Association for the Promotion of Skiing (“Alt om 
bakken”, Association for the Promotion of Skiing, 2011). After tenders Oslo Municipality signed 
up design-build contracts: one contract – with the team of creative specialists from architectural 
company “JDS Architects6” (Denmark), another one – with “Terramar AS7” (Norway), major 
construction contractor. The first contract is the owner-designer contract, which involved 
planning, design, and construction administration. The second contract is the owner-contractor 
                                                 
6
 http://www.jdsarchitects.com/ 
7
 http://www.terramar.no/ 
Fig. 4.1 Scheme of Holmenkollen (www.holmenkollen.com) 
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contract, which involves construction. An indirect, third-party relationship exists between 
designer and contractor due to these two contracts (Fig. 4.2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.2 Main parties of Holmenkollen project  
 
There were a lot of sub-contracts on execution phase. According to Project manager and Director 
of the project the total amount of sub-contracts was more than 20 local and foreign firms. 
Organizational structure of Holmenkollen project is illustrated in Fig. 4.3. The owner of the 
project, Oslo Municipality, is the top element of the structure. It “produces” main decisions 
regarding the project’s future, invests money and takes responsibility in front of the International 
and Norwegian Ski Federations, sportsmen and general public. Oslo Municipality communicated 
with leaders of contact groups of users and Norwegian organization of skiing, which set up their 
own claims the expectations regarding the project. Erik Øimoen was a Director of the project and 
accountable for Oslo Municipality. He communicated directly with Hagbarth Vogt-Lorentzen, 
building committee and architectures.  
 
Hagbarth Vogt-Lorentzen, a Project manager, was responsible for building the whole project and 
project’s infrastructure, management control, HR management and communication with sub-
contractors. For this purposes the project was divided into 6 subprojects, every subproject was 
headed by respective managers (Appendix D). Florian Kosche was one of the major sub-
contractors and the main engineer of Holmenkollenbakken. His team consisted of 10 people, 
involved in engineering works on ski hill. 
Owner: Oslo Municipality 
General contractor: Terramar AS Designer: JDS Architects  
Sub-contractors (more than 20) 
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Fig. 4.3 Organizational structure of Holmenkollen project8 
 
The structure of the project management is matrix. Several Groups of Construction managers are 
responsible for particular parts of the project. Relation between project manager and his 
subordinates is linear functional. The full-time project manager has considerable authority and 
full-time project administration staff. Initially the project’s leading group consisted of 7 
specialists: 6 core managers and one cost controller. During the PLC this leading croup was 
                                                 
8
 My respondents are marked out with grey colour. 
Engineer of 
Holmenkollenbakken 
Florian Kosche 
 
(Dipl.-Ing. Florian Kosche AS) 
Owner of the project 
(Commissioner for finance) 
Letter of 
assignment 
from NOI 
Director of the project 
Erik Øimoen  
 
(Building, project responsibility) 
Contact group 
Users (leaders) 
Building Committee 
 
(Advisors) 
Project manager 
Hagbarth Vogt-Lorentzen  
 
(Terramar AS) 
Contact group 
Users (representatives) 
Project management team  
(Appendix D) 
Contractors/Subcontractors 
 
(around 30 different companies) 
 
Architectures 
(JDS Architects) 
  
Master Thesis 2011 
 
45 
 
reduced to 5 people. Two people among this group were discharged, because they were failed 
with their work. “Due to the inaccuracy of their reports and discrepancy of the tasks it became 
obvious that they did not pay sufficient efforts to their jobs”, - Hagbarth Vogt-Lorentzen 
considered.  
 
4.1.3 Limitations of the project – sources of uncertainties  
 
During the interviews with my respondents it became known that the project management team 
faced a lot of uncertainties and problems during construction, caused by serious changes in 
architecture, tight schedule, slow decision making processes, pressure from external stakeholders 
and so on.  
 
Project was subjected to the limited time for construction, making and implementing decisions. 
Testing competition on Holmenkollen was planned to start in February 2010. This milestone 
could not be postponed in any cases. Erik Øimoen has joined the project in Jun. 2009. He 
characterized a project in few words: “It was not a normal project: it was behind all the 
deadlines and exceeded its costs”. Previous Director was discharged because of the slow 
progression, fails in costs and schedule analysis. When the decision to reconstruct the national 
arena was made by the city council in 2007, it was estimated to cost NOK 653 million. By 2008, 
the cost had accelerated to NOK 1.2 billion, and by the following year it had reached NOK 1.8 
billion (for detailed information regarding project progression see Fig. 4.4).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.4 Holmenkollen project progression in terms of costs and time  
 
Time:               2007            2008              2009             Milestone - Feb. 2010                      2011 
Costs NOK:   653 mln        1.2 bln         1.8 bln                                   1.9 bln (USD 400 mln) 
 
Testing 
Championship 
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City Commissioner for Business and Culture, Anette Wiig Bryn, had to leave her position 
because of the cost overruns. A consultant report ordered by the Municipality concluded that the 
pressure to find cost savings to stay within the budget, which was underestimated to start with, 
resulted in slower progress, which again resulted in higher costs (Vårt Land, 2011). Erik Øimoen 
and Hagbarth Vogt-Lorentzen specified the final costs of the project: the costs of the new large 
hill were NOK 715 million, while total costs for the upgrade of the national arena and 
infrastructure reached NOK 1.9 billion (around USD 370 mln). This included the construction of 
a new ski stadium next to Holmenkollbakken, and Midtstubakken, and upgrades to the 
Holmenkollen Line and all infrastructures.  
 
4.1.4 Complexity of the project  
 
Oslo Municipality, being obliged to realize such big project, did not know exactly what they 
should build and how? How much money should they spend on this project? Politicians could 
not agree also about some conceptual moments: Will it be just a ski arena? Or they should build 
a monument, visiting card of Oslo and whole Norway? Moreover, they did not have any 
experience in such field and in the very beginning did not use help of external firms. They 
decided to calculate singly, how much money are they ready to spend on the project? Therefore 
project’s initiation and planning stages were complicated and lasted much longer than they 
should. After long debates and communication with architectures politicians have agreed about 
the sum of NOK 653 mln for the construction project. “Qualified specialists call it “content 
without engineering”, when the planned costs were calculated without involvement of 
engineering specialist and other professionals. The luck of detailed elaboration have led to the 
costs underestimation on the earlier stages of the projects”, - Hagbarth Vogt-Lorentzen explains 
in his interview. Luck of agreement between project parties made the tasks even more 
complicated and has led to additional uncertainties of the project.  
 
 After the Municipality has realized that the project is late, they decided to stop planning and 
engineering stages of the project and go directly to the execution. “Reduced planning and 
engineering stages automatically lead to uncertainties and gaps in earlier risk-analysis” 
(Hagbarth Vogt-Lorentzen).  
 
  
The decision making process in the project was very slow 
earlier stages of the project:
decision without concurrence of the main stakeholders”, 
Lorentzen think. Thus, one of the biggest problems of Holmenkollen project was slow decision 
making process on the earlier stages. In the b
by the Client – Oslo Municipality
of the decision was not very high. On the execution phase project manager gained the right to 
make decisions without agreement with the Client 
subordinates acquire a right to make decisions without agreement with project manager 
NOK 30 000 (see Fig. 4.5). 
Fig. 4.5 Monetary liability level for making decisions
According to my respondents there was a “
of all, to the norms and rules of tenders procedures in Norway for public sector. 
law you are forced to have a competition between potential contractors
public sector are closed procedures. In general, it is time consuming process, but at the same 
time very good thing because they could c
reduce their risks and costs. However, during tenders’ procedures client made judgments based 
on the numbers, and did not include reputation of the companies into account. Thus, the 
uncertainty in relations with contractors was increa
that contractors would be very contrite and fulfil all conditions of the contracts. 
Decision 
making  
Master Thesis
and complicated, especially on the 
 “Important peculiarity of the project – was impossibility to make 
- Florian Kosche and Hagbarth Vogt
eginning of the project all decisions were controlled 
, thus it took much time to decide what to do even if the costs 
– up to NOK 1 000 000. Project manager’s 
 
 
specific market situation” of the project. It 
hoose the best contractors amon
sed. Project leaders could not be 100% sure 
> NOK 1 mln. (Oslo 
Municipality) 
NOK 30 000 - 1 mln. 
(Project Manager) 
< NOK 30 000 (Groups 
of project managers) 
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Uncertainties related to the governmental policy and construction standard did not impact the 
project significantly. “We worked according to the well-known standards and construction 
norms of Norway and International Ski Federation requirements for the hills” (Florian Kosche). 
“There were just some additional standards concerning recycling, heating and safety issues” 
(Hagbarth Vogt-Lorentzen). Thus, the legislative base was more or less stable and has not 
influenced the project.   
 
Impact of nature (so called force majeure) could be also included as a source of uncertainties. 
Since the team did not have additional time for construction, they had to do main construction 
works of Holmenkollenbakken during Sept.-Dec. 2009. “It was the worst time for doing it, but 
we couldn’t postpone” (Florian Kosche). “The weather was not with us: wind, rain, snow, ice... 
but we cope with it by changing positions, replacement of workplaces. These actions increased 
the costs of the project” (Erik Øimoen).  
 
4.1.5 How are uncertainties being understood and managed in Holmenkollen 
project? 
 
Every respondent notices that the most significant risk and uncertainty of the project was related 
to the Time-Costs-Quality constrains of the project. My respondents were “completely solidary” 
and several times insist on the major risk of the project: 
 
 
 
 
The team of the project had to stay within budget, time frames and to finish the project with 
required characteristics and to secure quality of ski arena.  
 
As we have seen in Fig. 4.4, the project consisted of two major parts: before the Testing 
Championship (Feb. 2010) and after. Thus, the main milestone was in February 2010, when the 
testing ski events should be started. The first part of the project was muddled on the slow 
decision making, therefore construction and all engineering works have begun much later, than it 
was planned. Thus, the first priority on this stage of the project was – to build the project in time. 
The costs increased significantly because of the tight schedule. “We could not postpone any 
DO NOT FINISH 
on time, within budget and with required quality 
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dates of Testing Championship. We had to build the arena on time at any costs. Otherwise, 
sportsmen, press, world community and other project’s stakeholders would blame us for our 
failure. Personally, it meant that I would lose my reputation...”, - explains Erik Øimoen. Thus, 
punishment and personal controls became useful tools of management control of the project. 
Together with restrictions of time, the goal was also to find the “good enough decisions” (that 
can satisfy quality requirements) in order to host the testing championship and to build a good 
ski jumping arena. Infrastructure was not as important as arena itself. Thus, time uncertainty was 
the first and most important factor to project success on the first phase of the project. During the 
realization of the second half of the project costs became the crucial factor, thus management 
methodises were change slightly as well. “We paid much more attention to accounting, 
fulfilment the tasks and contracts and tried to focus on details and infrastructure. Generally, 
during the realization of unique construction projects you have to throw off all the needless 
information, dismiss your personal emotions, use your experience, intuition and knowledge to 
make your team work”, - added Hagbarth Vogt-Lorentzen, project manager. Thus, formal 
systems, intuition and personal experience were used to overcome uncertainties related to the 
costs of the project. Own calculations were provided as well as “outsourced”. Because not only 
specialists from “Terramar AS” took part in the costs and risk analysis, but also external 
consultants did. 
 
There were a lot of parties involved in the project (e.g. contractors’ number was more than 20 
multinational firms). Big amount of contractors and sub-contractors has led to uncertainties and 
changes in the project’s schedule. The main steel-contractor of the project was from Sweden 
with its sub-contractor from Poland. Several times they did not fulfil the terms and conditions of 
an agreement. These delays have caused deviations in the tight schedule of the project and 
increased costs. Contactors and sub-contractors is just a one part of the project’s stakeholders.  
There were also other parties that had impact on the project’s realization (see Fig. 4.6). 
Municipality of Oslo (the owner) was the initiator, main decision maker of the project, cost-
controller and “middle man” in negotiations with other stakeholders. International Ski Federation 
produced the standards and together with sportsmen and Norwegian Ski Association expected 
the project team to fulfil all the terms and conditions to the World Ski Championship. 
Organizational committee was involved in the process of preparation to the Ski Championships; 
local operator of Holmenkollen arena is responsible for the current operations, museum, etc. 
(operational activities on the arena). Journalist all the time during the project monitored the 
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project’s progression and published information in mass media, which caused periodical 
misunderstandings, and even “scandals”. Florian Kosche, engineer of the project, shares 
Hagbarth’s opinion: “You have to be ready to work under the pressure of stakeholders, and 
especially from the side of media. You cannot stop it, so put it outside and do your job 
properly!” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.6 Stakeholders that had impact on the project 
 
Due to the big number of contractors from different countries cultural differences have appeared, 
as well as difficulties in communication, and influenced the project. All respondents considered 
that it was very difficult to communicate with the whole team of specialists and contractors 
insight the project. There were some problems in communication with partners from Poland and 
Italy, not only because of the language barriers, but because of their mentality. They did not pay 
much attention to the contracts and have caused delays in the PLC. Thus, it was a need to check 
them and sometimes use personal controls flying to these countries. Relations with designers and 
architectures were not easy as well. “They are very creative people, so they can create very 
expensive projects. We had to limit them, otherwise, we would never ended up within the planned 
budget”, - Erik Øimoen tells in his interview. On the question of how they decreased 
uncertainties in relations with architectures Hagbarth Vogt-Lorentzen told us that they have 
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calculated and found out the “Freezing” point, where they said “enough” to architectures (see 
Fig. 4.7). These point shows that any changes in design are not desirable and not possible, since 
the costs of changes become to be very high.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.7 Architectural risks and uncertainties  
 
Hagbarth Vogt-Lorentzen tells: “It was very important to stop the architectures in this point, 
because they could improve the project infinite number times. There is no limit for improvements 
and creativity, thus it is very important to find a crucial point where you will reduce uncertainty 
of the project and will not make any changes that lead to additional costs, time and changes in 
quality, which are the most important limitations of the project”. 
 
Returning to decision making, I can consider that slow decision making process has led to 
reduction of the planning and calculation stages of the project, which are extremely important for 
engineering. “We had to start later with implementation of the project because of the delays with 
important decisions concerning project design: instead of beginning working under the project 
in August-September, we started in February. We were 5 months behind the schedule, and 
consequently, we did not have enough time to calculate and to finish all engineering details. 
Thus, the only possible decision was to combine planning and execution. This decision increased 
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project uncertainties. To start a project you have to remember, that too late decisions cost a lot”, 
- Florian Kosche thinks.  
 
Strategically important decisions in Holmenkollen were made according to the following 
scheme: first, managers gathered information related to the problem situation, next consultants 
prepared reports and possible scenarios. Three different consulting companies did their 
independent evaluation of risks during the project. They prepared reports and possible scenarios. 
According to managers of Norwegian project, consultants are very important. Erik Øimoen is 
sure that they are “totally necessary, give a good input for making decisions”. Preliminary 
decisions involved evaluation of information, received from consultants and independent 
assessing of the project management team. Thus, it was in general 3-4 possible scenarios for the 
future of the project. According to the respondents, common sense, intuition and “God feeling” 
were involved in making decisions. 
 
4.1.6 Levers of control used for managing uncertainties in Holmenkollen project  
 
The project management team used variety of control tools in order to keep the project on the 
right track. Following paragraphs summarise all findings in relation to the structure of 
management control (Simon’s levers of control).  
 
Beliefs System – committing workers to organizational objectives  
 
It was not hard to build a belief system, because skiing – is the most popular sport in Norway. 
Modern ski arena – is symbol and prestige of the country. According to Erik Øimoen, Director of 
the project, the main goal of construction of ‘New’ Holmenkollen was “not only to build a 
modern ski arena for ski championships, but also create a national symbol of Norway. It was one 
of the biggest challenges of our project, because we were obliged to take into account and 
appreciate opinions, desires and requirements of every single stakeholder of the project. And of 
course, we had strict frames in terms of time, budget and quality”. Project decisions were made 
in accordance with the interests of the stakeholders (strategy, mission, corporate values, goals, 
choice of suppliers, etc.). Trust could be also added as a management control tool. Because many 
parties have been trusted each other (trust to contractors, to people insight of the project 
management team, etc.).  
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Boundary System – constraining the degree of freedom  
 
Project was running with a strict schedule and costs conditions. Managers also had limits of their 
responsibilities. Moreover, managers of the project established explicit limits and rules which 
must be respected by their subordinates. Subordinates were obliged for frequent reporting to the 
next managerial levels of the project. The scheme of the reporting was standardized. Higher level 
managers delegated responsibilities to their colleagues (as it was discussed in paragraph about 
decision-making). Creativity of the architectures was maintained since the Client wanted to build 
a “symbol” of Norway, but at the same time it was controlled when the costs of changes were 
inadmissible.  
 
Creation of special working atmosphere and self-motivation were very important in the project. 
“If people do interesting work, feel that they create something new and unique, and, especially, 
if they can influence the project, employees are satisfied and motivated” (Florian Kosche). There 
were not used any special motivation and bonuses systems in the project, just general system of 
remuneration of labour. Fear of losing and punishment were used as motivation tool (to some 
degree, and not too much), because “you could lose your authority and weightiness in the project 
if you will become a dictator. It will never work in Norway” (Erik Øimoen). Too much pressure 
is very bad, because it creates the atmosphere of distrust and apprehension. It is better to create 
an atmosphere there every worker feels his/herself as important part of doing something good 
and important. Mass media were considered as a kind of motivation as well. “Holmenkollen 
became an important part and touristic symbol of Oslo. The “special spirit” helped us to create 
working atmosphere and to build our project successfully”, - tells Erik Øimoen.  
 
Interactive Control System – working proximity and proactive decisions making  
 
Changes in visions of the main stakeholders were considered as important factors of project’s 
success. Many issues were negotiated with external consultants and with different levels of 
management of the project. Relations between project’s team-members were trustful, but 
potential threats related to contractors were solved by “personal checking and double-checking”. 
In many situations managers used comprehensive managerial tools. “When even weekly meetings 
did not give the entire picture of project progression, it became important to be on the 
construction site and provide personal controls, and punishment, if needed”, – added Erik 
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Øimoen. He thinks that informal communication in the project was more effective than the 
formal one, since managers “become a part of the project”. Directors and managers of the big 
projects in Norway are really opened for communication with average executives. People can 
come to them, if they had some problems. Thus, problems could be solved faster and without 
involvement of additional number of people.  
 
Based on interactions, project management implemented two types of controls: (i) Proactive 
control and (ii) Quality control. Proactive control in relations with contractors is very important 
in order to avoid delivery derangement. Quality control – is assurance that resources used for 
construction and construction itself is done due to the norms and standards. This type of control 
was performed by special group of qualified managers that checked the quality and prepared 
reports to the project manager.  
 
Diagnostic Control System – monitoring project’s progression and results  
 
MC of the project consisted of 3 “levels”: from the side of Client (Oslo Municipality); from the 
side of Project Manager; and from the side of Groups of managers. Different “levels” used 
varied management control tools. The Client required monthly reports and regularly meetings 
with Director of the project, who received all the information from the project manager (with 
frequency – 1 month and 2 weeks respectively). During the most “problematic” phases of the 
project there were 2 weeks reports and weekly meetings. Sometimes it was not enough for 
getting a clear picture of the project, thus Director of the project provided personal controls on 
construction site.   
 
Project manager exploited a system of interdisciplinary checking. The whole project was realized 
through the parallel-sequential operations procedures. Thus a lot of operations were dependent 
on the previous ones and could not be started without completion of the earlier phases. The 
project was divided into subprojects and different managers were responsible for these 
subprojects. Project manager received monthly reports from the above mentioned managers (on 
the “peak” of the project these reports were more frequent). Managers used a template form for 
their reports. They included description of the project progress, risk matrix for 6 boxes, i.e. sub-
projects, cost reports and prognoses. It was not a simple task for the project manager to match all 
details and project spheres into the one complete picture. Kick-off working meetings (3-4 hours 
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every month/ every two weeks on the “peaks”) and personal observation on the project helped 
him with this difficult task.  
 
Electronic tools were also used for management control and making decisions. “We used 
Microsoft Outlook and Software OPERA Project”, – added the project manager. OPERA 
Project, Microsoft Excel based tool, a Norwegian analogue of MS Project, as the project 
management software was used for detailed planning, assigning resources to tasks, tracking 
progress, managing budgets and analyzing workloads. The application creates critical path 
schedules, and critical chain and event chain methodology. This tool gave a good basic for 
making decisions and management control: from the diagrams (schedules, resources, 
responsibilities division, etc. visualized in Gantt charts) you see the project progression, and 
deviations of results planned with results achieved. The Groups of “matrix” managers used 
weekly or daily follow-ups together with the ICT. Personal control and observation were also 
provided.  
 
4.1.7 Lessons learned from the project: “Late decisions cost a lot” (Florian 
Kosche): 
 
1) Underestimation of cost consequences. “We 
had a system of management control and 
cost control, but we underestimated 
importance of the first stages of initiation 
and planning, during which we had to plan 
our expenditures”, - adds Hagbarth Vogt-
Lorentzen.  
2) Gaps in the risk analysis (earlier risk analysis did not match completely with practical 
implementation of the project). “We added new risks to the basic risk management plan 
from month to month”, - tells Hagbarth Vogt-Lorentzen. 
3) Concerning decision making. Quantitative and qualitative techniques have to be combined 
for making decisions. Best formula for making decisions is using external consultants and 
own intuition. It is important also to trust your team. Good advice to the Clients – to be 
more flexible in making decisions, because it could lead to the luck of time for 
engineering, for example. And it will cause the underestimation of cost consequences.  
During 
construction  
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4) Importance of agreement among different 
groups of stakeholders, harmonization of 
visions and aims of the project, finding a 
“freezing point” in relation and negotiations 
with architectures and engineers. You do 
not have to lose control and should take into 
account cultural differences in working with international teams. There are differences 
between collaboration with firms from Western and Eastern parts of Europe, for example, 
you can rely on your contractors from Germany, Austria and Switzerland, but you have to 
check your partners from Poland and Italy, because they do not pay much attention to the 
management control and reporting. Thus, you have to take it into consideration, because it 
could impact the design of MCS.  
5) Respondents have summarized that next time they should foresee and plan some system of 
motivation. It was one of the omissions of the project, simply because they did not have 
time and did not pay attention to this problem.  
6) Do not practice “closed” tenders and negotiate with firms before signing the contact. Learn 
more from the private business practices.  
7) Importance to have experienced people in the project team. “Experienced people overcome 
uncertainties related to the project much easier. They make their decisions faster, based on 
the previous projects. Working under the big construction project is impossible without 
previous experience in particular field” – Erik Øimoen tells in his interview.  
8) Nature risks and uncertainties are even more predictable then actions of stakeholders, but 
they still impact the project.  
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4.2 UKRAINIAN CASE:  
“THE DIAMOND OF DONETSK” 
 
4.2.1 About Donbass Arena  
 
The Donbass Arena is the first stadium in 
Eastern Europe designed and built to UEFA 
elite standards. With a capacity of 51,504 
spectators, the Stadium hosts FC Shakhtar 
Donetsk matches and will host matches in 
Euro 2012. The initial estimated cost of the 
project was USD 185 mln; USD 30 mln has 
been allocated to set up a recreational park 
around the Stadium (77,000 plants grow in the park). The final cost of the project and the 
surrounding park landscaping reached USD 400 mln. Construction was launched on Jun. 2006 
(corresponding contract signed with Turkish company ENKA). Construction was completed in 
2009 (and took 1,158 days). To erect the five-star arena to such a tight schedule (3 years) over 
1,600 people worked on site at peak times. In 2010 the arena has received several awards, 
including: the 2009 Top Construction Site 
award by Donetsk Design & Construction 
Club, the 2009 Best International Mobotix 
Project award, the 2009 Best Construction in 
Ukraine prize. Stadium includes also 53 
fast-food outlets, a fan cafe, 4 Silver bars, 3 
restaurants (Diamond, Platinum, Gold), a 
media cafe and a lounge bar will satisfy any 
visitor’s taste, FC Shakhtar Museum and 
brand shop for souvenirs. 
 
4.2.2 Project organization: structure, subordination and personnel   
 
An alternate contract was chosen for construction of Donbass Arena, compared to 
Holmenkollen. The model replaces the two traditional contracts with three contracts: owner-
Nowadays  
During 
constructio
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designer, owner-construction project manager, and owner-builder. Main parties of the project 
and relationships between them are illustrated in the Fig. 4.8. The formal owner (client) of the 
stadium is Football Club “Shakhtar Donetsk” (General Director – is Sergei Palkin). The factual 
owner and single investor of the project is Rinat Akhmetov, President of the FC Shakhtar 
Donetsk and the richest men in Ukraine. Since the owner had limited experience with and 
knowledge of complex sport construction projects, he hired a separate private designer, project 
manager and general contractor. Choosing of designer and contractor was done after opened 
tender procedures. Project manager worked earlier with the client, and he was appointed after the 
client signed up the contracts with designers and general contractor.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.8 Main parties of Donbass Arena project  
 
The stadium was designed by “Arup Sport”9 group (England), authors of the world’s famous 
buildings, such as The Sydney Opera House (Australia), City of Manchester Stadium (Great 
Britain), Allianz Arena stadium in Munich (Germany), Beijing National Stadium or the Bird’s 
Nest (China), etc. Designer met all the wishes and requirements of the client. The contract for 
being a project manager of Donbass Arena was signed with Sergey Isakov (who is Technical 
Director of the stadium nowadays). The construction manager’s role was to provide construction 
advice to the designer, on the owner’s behalf, design advices to the constructor, again on the 
owner’s behalf, and other advices as necessary. The construction project management company 
was an additional party engaged in direct construction. Project manager and his team were aimed 
to provide assistance to this company – Turkish leading construction company ENKA10, since 
                                                 
9
 http://www.arup.com/ 
10
 http://www.enka.com/Default.aspx 
Owner: FC “Shakhtar Donetsk” 
General contractor: 
ENKA 
Designer:  
Arup Sport  
Sub-contractors (around 15) 
Project manager: 
Sergey Isakov  
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ENKA11 was not ready and not able to cope with Ukrainian legislation and other business factors 
and problems. ENKA has chosen sub-contractors independently, since the responsibility of the 
project was mainly on it, but client’s service checked all tender procedures and could influence 
the decisions of ENKA. The Director of the project from the Turkish side and my respondent is 
Ugur Koyunoglu. He mentioned that Turkish construction firm ENKA used help of 15 
subcontractors from all over the world.  
 
Structure of management of Donbass Arena from the owner’s side is linear and illustrated in Fig. 
4.9. During the realization of the project, project manager of Donbass Arena was accounted for 
the General Director of the project, who was involved in negotiations with Board of Directors, 
Euro – 2012 Committee and Client of the project. Together with a project manager, General 
Director was involved in the project management and was responsible for “spending” investor’s 
money. 
 
 
Fig. 4.9 Managers of Donbass Arena project (owner’s side) 
 
Organizational structure of the project management team was linear functional. Project 
management team was divided into 6 departments: PMO and Analytical department; Department 
                                                 
11
 http://www.enka.com 
Investor / President of the FC “Shakhtar”  
Rinat Akhmetov 
General Director of the FC “Shakhtar” 
Sergei Palkin 
 
General Director of the project 
Vladimir Kovalevsky 
Board of Directors and 
Supervisory Board 
(Investor Service) 
Project manager & project management team 
Sergei Isakov  
  
of initiation and preparation; Technical Department; Finance Department; Legal Department and 
Administrative Department. Each of the departments included other groups that were responsible 
for particular parts of the project. For example, 
included architectural and engineering bureaus, and front pre
structure was headed by project manager, who was accountable for Director of the project. 
Turkish contractor had more
contract. Due to the contract, Turkish company ENKA was obliged 
all decisions concern the project with General Director 
Director of the project was able to make decisions regarding the project
without consent of investor. Project manager did not take any actions without 
General Director if the sum of 
Fig. 4.
 
“Complicated way of making project’s decisions was not the only problem we faced with. 
beginning of the project we faced a 
team there were a lot of people in age of 50
style of work (that was gained 
construction materials and technologies
competent to solve the disputable questions and sometimes made the obstacles and slowed down 
the process of construction itself. That is why almost 90% of those people were replac
younger specialists. Over 1,600 people worked on site at peak times, mostly Turks and 
Decision 
making  
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 or less the same structure, because it was earlier agreed in the 
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decision was more than USD 30 000 (see Fig. 4.10)
10 Monetary liability level for making decisions
problem with our personnel”, - said Sergey Isakov. In the 
-60 years. These people did not want to change their 
during “soviet” times), improve their knowledge concerning 
, ICT and construction techniques. They were not 
> USD 100 000 
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Ukrainians. Donbass Arena and ENKA had parallel positions in the organizational structure of 
the project (Turkish engineer – Ukrainian engineer, Turkish experts of the customs department – 
Ukrainian experts of the customs department, etc.). “Our accountants were not ready to deal 
with Ukrainian reporting agencies, thus they prepared financial reports with the help of 
Ukrainian specialists”, - Ugur Koyunoglu mentioned in his interview. Due to the contract 
between owner and contractor, ENKA had to harmonize the organizational structure with the 
client’s project management group.  
 
4.2.3 Environment of the project 
 
Unstable Ukrainian law, regular changes in construction norms and standards, pressure from the 
side of media and Committee EURO-2012 are the major characteristics of the project’s 
environment. There are a lot of specific rules and standards in Ukrainian legal system. Company 
ENKA, for instance, was forced to open a representative office in Ukraine because of the 
Ukrainian legislation. Only residents of a country can carry out all the current activities. They 
must maintain accounting records in accordance with Ukrainian standards. Other features of the 
Ukrainian legislation and bureaucracy will be discussed further in the chapter. Fig. 4.11 
examines the groups of stakeholders involved in the project.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.11 Stakeholders of the project of construction of Donbass Arena 
 
Stakeholders 
of the project 
 
FIFA, local and other 
authorities 
FC “Shakhtar 
Donetsk” EURO 2012 
Committee  
Media (TV and 
press) 
Contractors and sub-contractors 
(around 15 multinational teams) 
 
Designers and 
architectures 
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FIFA, local and other authorities have influenced the project in terms of issuing standards and 
norms of construction the arena. FIFA has checked the projects progression and received the 
annual reports. Local and other authorities provided testing of the materials of construction, 
conformed the plans of construction, etc. Architectures monitored the project’s progression and 
kept vigilant watch over the loyalty to author’s rights. FC “Shakhtar Donetsk”, the main user of a 
stadium, was interested to get convenient arena for training, medical assistance and hosting the 
football matches. Media was a source of many scandals which made difficulties in relations with 
contractors and other parties. They monitored the project’s progression through the “pleiad” of 
press-conferences with leaders of the project12.  
 
One important and distinctive feature of the project is that managers decided to gain their 
experience not from the own mistakes, but try to learn from the people’s experience who have 
already done it (Portugal, Holland, etc.). Thus, the project managers went to the stadiums in 
Lisbon (Portugal), Amsterdam (Holland), Arena Allianz in Munich (Germany), Bird’s nest in 
Beijing (China). The project manager and temporary director of the stadium in Lisbon, for 
example, shared his experience and helped a lot. “The Lisbon’s stadium was build according to 
the world’s standards. The project has paid off in 4 years – it is just unbelievable, and it is a 
record time for such type of project. Thus, it was a lot of moments in management that we could 
learn from their experience. It helped us a lot. Now we share our experience with project 
managers and directors of construction of other stadiums in Ukraine, Russia and Belorussia. 
Thus, it was important to collaborate with local production firms, project institutes, and juridical 
companies (land rights issues). It is best to consult early in the project than to lose more in the 
end”, - Sergei Palkin thinks.  
 
4.2.4 Project’s characteristics as the main sources of uncertainties  
 
The decision to build a stadium was made in 2004, since that time investor have signed the 
contract with designers. However, in 2006, when project manager Sergey Isakov came into the 
project, they had 1 year behind schedule. “Instead of planned two years of construction of 
Donbass Arena, we spend one year more and arena was ready in August 2009”. The total costs 
of the project increased more than twice. The project management team have analysed the main 
                                                 
12
 Leaders in this context mean project manager, director of the project and other competent people who were 
involved in the project management.  
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reasons for their failures later. Some of the major problems in the project that led to additional 
costs and time of the project were the following:  
- Slow and complicated decision making process due to the language problems and 
disagreements with parties of the project; 
- Luck of clarity of the prescribed tasks, rights and responsibilities in the contract;   
- Weak initiation and reduced planning stage of the project; 
- Ukrainian mentality and “force majeure”.  
There are some peculiarities of big projects that will be similar in Ukraine and other countries. 
However, there are a lot of distinctive characteristics as well. I will discuss the above mentioned 
factors more detailed below. 
 
Decision making process was time consuming and complicated, since parties signed a contract 
and agreed that they will negotiate concerning project’s decisions. “Even simple question that 
did not lead to ascending the budget was negotiated between ENKA and Donbass Arena, 
because it was earlier agreed in the contract”, - Ugur Koyunoglu explains. The official 
language of correspondents was considered English. Neither Turks nor Ukrainians were very 
good in English. “We used interpreters to translate our letters from Russian or Turkish to 
English... Even the word ‘feet out’ was translated many times in different ways. It caused many 
problems, first of all – time wasting”, - Sergei Isakov thinks. It took much time to understand 
each other. The process of communication and decision making was the follows: company 
ENKA, for example, wanted to make some changes in the project and use substitute materials for 
construction. Action group has discussed disputable questions with their administration. If the 
proposal was worth attention, it was written as an offer in Turkish. These documents were sent to 
the interpreters for translation into English. Very often interpreters were in luck of engineering 
knowledge and basics of project management. Thus, offers in English frequently have not been 
adequate to the initial documents in Turkish. Moreover, many moments were discussed with 
juridical and financial departments, since Turkish and Ukrainian legislation is different. Before 
the letters have come to the project management of Donbass Arena, they were translated from 
English to Russian. Thus, sometimes it could last more than one week for agreement between the 
two sides, ENKA and Donbass Arena administration. 
  
As I have already mentioned, Ukraine is far from being the most stable country in the world, 
especially what concerns Ukrainian law and business environment. Since Ukrainian legislation is 
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not stable, it impacts construction industry as well: changes related to safety on the stadium, roof 
covering the tribunes, etc. For example, “requirements to the load factors were changed several 
times during the PLC. Thus, we had to make some changes in our plans, improve quality. It 
increased the final costs of the project” – Sergei Palkin mentioned during the interview. 
Moreover, Ukrainian government as well as other bodies and authorities still do not want “to 
talk” to foreigners. We could call it remnants of Soviet society. Because a lot of leading position 
in the country occupied by old people that prefer to work according to the old norms. Or even 
worth – these positions are occupied by the “new generation”, which tries to take their own 
interests and benefits in every situation.  
 
Thus, there were a lot of problems, caused by Ukrainian law and specifics of business 
environment. Construction of roof was renewed a couple of times, because German 
subcontractors’ specialists had to harmonize their project with Ukrainian norms, which changed 
several times in one year. The process of testing the materials of the roof lasted around 6 months. 
It was done both in Ukraine and in Turkey. ENKA had problems with customs clearance also, 
thus, “we had to help them, because we could lose more in consequence of idle materials. Two 
Ukrainian specialists helped their Turkish colleagues with customs authorities, courts, etc.”, - 
Sergey Isakov said.  
 
One of the major features of Ukrainian construction projects is that in the earlier stages of the 
project there is no “transcript” of the ideas of the initiator of the project, i.e. client. The same 
problem was in Donbass Arena project. We could call it a problem of “weak” initiation and 
reduced planning stages of the project. “In Europe there is requirement of providing all the 
information about the future project, preliminary analysis of budget and time frames. In our 
project we had only the general idea which was not described as “painted by numbers” project. 
We have not got the complete picture even after signing a contract with ENKA, because we 
continued modifying some elements of the project, aligned some of the issues with the client and 
other stakeholders. These uncertainties have led to the big risk of getting the final results that do 
not meet customer requirements”, - Sergey Isakov said.  
 
Not only Ukrainian law and business tradition are important sources of uncertainties in the 
project. It became known that there were some problems related to the Ukrainian mentality also. 
For example, “the New Year celebration lasts in Ukraine almost two weeks. When we build 
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Donbass Arena, 01.Jan there were absent just 2 people from 1000 Turkish workers because of 
the sickness. But almost 90% of Ukrainians were absents due to “unreadiness” to work”, - tells 
Ugur Koyunoglu. Thus, the delays of the project could not be avoided. And the last, but not least 
in this section is that “force majeure” of the project can be related to both, the nature and to the 
Ukrainian government. Situation with Ukrainian legislation and governmental authorities were 
discussed earlier in the chapter. Nature impact refers to the winter time in Ukraine, when it is 
very cold, and therefore construction works were stopped several times during the project.  
 
4.2.5 How are uncertainties being understood and managed in Donbass Arena 
project? 
 
The major risks and uncertainties of the project were related to the following: Do not finish 
project on time with a particular planned and required quality and to avoid increasing costs of the 
project. Uncertainties of the project can be divided into several groups. I will describe them step-
by-step. 
  
One of the dominant uncertainties lies in relations with general contractor. It includes 
inconsistency of tasks, reports and difficulties in collaboration between the project teams. 
“Client wants to get a product with particular characteristics in a limited period of time and 
within budget, at the same time contractor wants to get a profit (as much as possible), thus it 
could use other materials and so on just to make the “fast” money”, - explains Sergey Palkin. 
Such changes could influence the quality of the project. Thus, instead of trusting the contractor, 
project manager and his team provided personal controls and established analytical department.   
Project leaders underestimated importance of Analytical department in the beginning of the 
project. “We did not have an Analytical department from the very beginning of the project, but 
we realized that it is very important not “to take for granted” information from the contractor, 
but to check it independently” (Sergei Isakov). Another side of this uncertainty is that Turkish 
company “ENKA” did not have some departments in the beginning of the project, e.g. a Front 
pre-production. Thus, project has faced some problems on the initial and planning stages of the 
construction of Donbass Arena. From the Client’s side there were two specialists, who were 
responsible for getting permits from the government (land, electricity, and a lot of another types 
of documents). Turkish company did not expect that they could face a problem. Since the 
contract between client and builder required harmonized structure, Turkish company was under 
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obligation to create the same department. “We prescribed all the terms, conditions and the 
structures in the contract. The contract was very thick but we avoided a lot of potential problems 
you could face with during the project” (Sergei Isakov). 
 
Thus, uncertainty in relation with ENKA was handled by coordinated work of project managers 
and harmonizing working structure of the project on both sides: the client and contractor. “The 
issue was to have the same controls in the two above mentioned structures, where every 
department of the project has a “clone-department” in the structure of your contractor 
(engineers from ENKA should work very closely with the same specialists from the side of the 
Client)”, - Sergei Palkin mentioned during the interview. These requirements were prescribed in 
the contract. According to Sergey Isakov fundamental of success of the project – is in the 
contract between Client and contractor. “I cannot say that we did not change anything in the 
contract. We continued to work on the contract during the project. New problems appeared all 
the time, thus we added more than 10 applications (additional agreements concerning different 
questions of the project)”. Moreover, in order to avoid misunderstandings, information gathered 
was reliable and well-timed. That is why they provided personal controls and observations 
together with contractor’s reports in order to ensure the quality of the project. It was a common 
situation when contractor hided information in order to avoid some conflicts and 
misunderstandings with client. In order to get truthful information there was established 
technical supervision of customer service that monitored the quality of the project and gathered 
information. General construction department included 13 persons, mechanical works 
monitoring – 15 persons, electrical supervision department – 10 persons. After gathering 
information it was transferred to the analytical department, which developed reports for the 
management.  
 
Language problem was very significant in relations with major contractor in the beginning of the 
project. However, project managers overcome it later. Sergey Isakov explains: “From the very 
beginning me and my colleagues were not good enough in English, but closer to the end of the 
project we improved our skills as well as the Turkish specialists. Thus, it became easier to 
communicate with them. I can add also that qualified specialists will understand each other on 
the “round-table”, even if they do not use the same language”, - said Sergei Isakov. Thus, key 
figures if the project as well as other employees improved their skills in English during the 
project in order to decrease the risks of misunderstanding.  
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As for architectures supervision during the PLC, it was not very strong. Because on the design 
stage they delegated powers to the company ENKA and agreed in the contract that ENKA will 
work out details of the project. “We thought that we reduced the risks, but we were mistaken, 
because in such projects it is always better to spend more time with architectures working 
together with major contractor in order to get a complete project and obtain detailed plan of 
actions”, - Sergey Isakov thinks. From one side they avoided risks of conflicts with architectures 
but increased uncertainties, concerned detailed planning and elaboration of the project. Luck of 
detailed planning and elaboration has caused time and cost overruns. It increased a risk of getting 
the final results that do not meet customer requirements as well. Analytical department partially 
helped to solve this uncertainty and to control the costs and schedule overruns, but it was later, 
not on the first stages of the project. Since that time project was already one year behind 
schedule and more than twice exceeded its costs. The reason for this lies in the luck of detailed 
planning and structuring project’s works, which they did not have in the beginning of the project. 
 
Ukraine – is very specific country in terms of its business culture, laws and norms, bureaucracy 
of the government and other authorities. Construction is that industry that requires a lot of 
compulsory supervisions, technical controls and expertises. “It is a wrong opinion that in 
Ukraine you could easy buy everything: even the court and local authorities”, - Ugur Koyunoglu 
said. “You could face authorities where you should pay to enforce the process of your case, but 
the expertise will be done according to all standards, because the poor-quality implementation 
of the project may entail casualties. It is complicated procedure in Ukraine, thus you have to be 
ready to spend more time for getting all permissions”.  
 
However, there were a lot of quality controls, security requirements and many other testing 
procedures, technical expertises of quality of materials of products and materials, required not 
only by Ukrainian governments (e.g. Ukrainian Certificates - UkrSepro13), but Standards of 
UEFA. It worth to notice, that Ukrainian construction standards were changed several times 
during construction. UEFA also provided a strong supervision under this project. Management of 
the firm ENKA underestimated this situation, therefore they needed help with customs, permit 
documents and other approvals. “It is much paper work and ... bureaucracy. All the time you 
need Ukrainian people in your team to help to solve the problems” (Ugur Koyunoglu). Another 
uncertainty caused by government is inconsistency of the legislation that needs double coherence 
                                                 
13
 http://ukrsepro.kiev.ua/ 
Master Thesis 2011 
 
68 
 
on the planning and designing stages of the project: “You have to visit the same authorities and 
discuss almost the same issues, but fulfil other papers” (Ugur Koyunoglu). It needs time and 
frequent negotiations which may affect the project schedule. It means that you should be patient, 
be ready for negotiations and use the help of local people. Formula for successful relations with 
Ukrainian authorities (Ugur Koyunoglu): Time + patience + money = Alignment in the 
Ukrainian authorities  
 
Not only Ukrainian bureaucracy and unstable legislation have made work of the teams more 
difficult. Cultural differences and necessity of work in multinational teams required some more 
attention from the side of directors and project managers. There were around 15 different 
contractors all over the world. Thus, there were difficulties in understanding of these parties due 
to the cultural differences and language barriers. For example, one German contractor was very 
sceptical to work with Ukrainian specialists. Colleagues from Germany thought that Ukrainians 
are not very skilled and tried to obtrude their opinions upon local specialists. This problem was 
called later on as “Germany landscaping case”. Germans neglected educational level of 
Ukrainian specialists, for instance engineers and architectures. It was caused by the differences 
in norms, requirements and standards of construction projects. Germans had another views on 
many disputable questions. German legislation states that roads should be build like that: 1.5 
meters deep down, but Ukrainian norms state that it should be 0.9 meters, thus it was no sense to 
spend additional resources (materials, time, money, human resources) to satisfy German 
standards. “Our investor said that we can save money and spent them on other needs, at least, 
premiums of the economy”, - Sergei Palkin said. “We spent much time on discussions and 
correcting plans. However, we learned something from them as well: new materials, new ways of 
testing the materials, etc.” (Sergey Isakov) 
 
Cultural differences we could discern also in the approach of Turkish partners: their workers 
were divided into different castes, every caste had particular colour of their helmets: the white 
ones – the managers, blue ones – quality controllers, yellow ones – are usual workers and so on. 
It is not common in Ukraine to divide employees into castes or other groups. There were a lot of 
interorganizational and personal conflicts between managers and general workers of Donbass 
Arena and company ENKA. For example, “we could not agree on some moment of the project 
with financial department, sometimes there were conflicts between architectures, engineers and 
even project managers and directors. There was a fight between Turks and Ukrainians, but we 
Master Thesis 2011 
 
69 
 
solved these conflicts using motivation and corporate events (fishing, etc.)”, - Sergey Isakov 
mentioned. Thus, possible solution was: regular meetings, accurate reports about project 
progression, and team-building.  
 
4.2.6 Levers of control used for managing uncertainties in Donbass Arena 
construction project  
 
The project management team used many tools of MC, which could be divided into four groups 
– Simon’s levers of control: belief, interactive, diagnostic and boundary systems.  
 
Beliefs System – committing workers to organizational objectives  
 
The goal of the project was to build symbol of Donbass and modern sport arena for hosting 
matches of FC “Shakhtar Donetsk” and EURO-2012. Trust as controls tool in Ukrainian projects 
cannot be considered as such, because Ukrainians prefer not trust, but check everything by 
themselves. However, both sides of the project – contractor ENKA and team of Donbass Arena 
succeeded in motivating people to work. Different motivation systems were used by two sides of 
the project (client organization and main contractor). Every system included both financial and 
nonfinancial incentives.  
 
ENKA used a system of bonuses in the case of over-fulfilment the plan results. Workers had 1 
day off – every 15 days. Once during 3 months all workers could fly to Turkey to visit their 
families due to the company. The most important nonfinancial incentive is: prestige to work in 
the Turkish company ENKA, which is well known and very popular company in Turkish labour 
market. Donbass Arena had also a system of financial bonuses – according to the results 
achieved during the year (in the case of improved quality, time saving and budget’s economy). 
One of the major tools for encouraging people to perform tasks efficiently was using own 
example and faithful execution of the tasks by project manager and other “top-persons”. It built 
respectable relationships and a special climate among the team members. Sport competitions 
between employees, fishing with their families and Turkish colleagues, etc. are some examples 
of nonfinancial incentives used by client organization for strengthening spirit of the team and 
encouragement to complete the project with over-fulfilment of the results planned. 
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Boundary System – constraining the degree of freedom  
 
According to my respondents, MC in the project was a continuous process: controls of input 
(materials, people, equipment, etc.) – transformation (process of construction, people, materials, 
etc.) – output (final result). Checking and controlling were carried out continuously and 
elaborately. “There is no sense to control only the last stage of the project. You have to be aware 
about the quality of “input” materials and so on, because of you will not be certain about 
materials used – you will never receive certain result of the project. Thus, to manage the project 
successfully you have to implement continuous management control, and to use system 
approach”, - Sergey Isakov is sure.  
 
Project budget and time schedule were well-defined in the contract, thus every member of the 
project had to follow this limitations. Managers also had limits of their responsibilities (in terms 
of monetary limits for making their own decisions). Project managers established the rules of 
behaviour, using their own examples of how should people work. Subordinates were obliged for 
frequent reporting to the next managerial levels of the project. Creativity of the architectures was 
limited as soon as the Client endorsed the project’s model.  
 
Another side of this type of control is double-checking. “I checked everything by myself. 
Sometimes my Turkish colleagues were in shock, when I started to hop and jump on some design 
and (or) construction elements, - Sergey Isakov said. It was done because we have to predict 
even vandalism actions of football hooligans, which are widespread not only in Ukraine”. 
Moreover Ukraine has much striker norms and standards when concerns to some spheres of the 
projects (e.g., the fire safety). Quality and technical controls and care of the working standards 
on the construction site were high from both sides: ENKA and Donbass Arena.  
 
Interactive Control System – working proximity and proactive decisions making  
 
Three most important limitations of the project (Quality, Costs and Schedule) were controlled by 
both sides: (i) from the side of ENKA: Department of quality (men in “blue helmets”), (ii) from 
the side of Donbass Arena - Department of Technical Supervision. Teams spent much time on 
negotiations. Working meetings and negotiations between project managers of ENKA and 
Donbass Arena had lasted every day. Concerning some vital issues, meetings of project 
Master Thesis 2011 
 
71 
 
managers could happen even 2-3 times per a day. From the beginning of the project these 
working meetings lasted ca 1.5 hour, but in order to be efficient and not to waste time on 
dalliance, managers have learned to communicate faster, go straight to the point and solved 
problems immediately. For solving current/ every-day problems managers have spent 
approximately 20 minutes, when they have found “common language”, using literally speaking 
papers with numbers, drawings, sketches and other figures.  
 
Diagnostic Control System – monitoring project’s progression and results  
 
Diagnostic Control System is consisted of kick-off meetings, compulsory reports and ICT tools. 
There was formal agreement that subordinates have to report to the project management. This 
reports had daily, weekly, and monthly characters (i.e. on demand of the project manager). 
Primarily, it was checking the progression of unit managers and heads of departments (once a 
month). The conditions of reporting were prescribed earlier and were the same for all employees. 
However, to be sure in the employees, manager of the project provided one interesting scheme of 
control: sometimes he gave deliberately misrepresented and obviously wrong tasks, i.e. with luck 
of information to their employees (for example to engineers, etc.). If they did not have any 
question during the processing the tasks it became obvious that they do not “own” the situation 
and do their jobs in a wrong way. Thus, these employees were replaced by more competent ones. 
 
Once in 6 months reports for client/investor were prepared by project manager and director of 
the project. Analytical tools were also used for planning and controlling the project. The team 
used “Spider project”, project management package, designed and developed by Russian 
developer company Spider Project (Moscow). It is a Russian analogue of “MS Project”. The 
information was processed in analytical department and used as a tool for making decisions. 
Firm ENKA did not confess that they used similar system, but it became known that they used 
“MS Project”. It is almost the same program with similar capabilities and graphs of the projects.  
Sergey Isakov: “The best way to avoid projects risks and problems was to use system approach: 
to build a structure with clearly defined powers and requirements to the employees. We used 
also a system of global monitoring in our project: narrow specialists were responsible for their 
parts of work, analytical department gathered information and gave it to managers for making 
their decisions concerned project’s future”.  
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4.2.7 Lessons learned: “The one who does not work does not make any mistakes” 
(Sergey Isakov):  
 
1) Nobody can and should not put all the responsibility on the contractors.  “That is why we 
did not rely on our contractors and checked their activities all the time. In that way we 
avoided problems with theft, fraud and so on, which are very common in the construction 
of similar projects (building of stadiums in Kharkiv, L’viv, Kyiv, Odessa related to EURO 
2012)”, - Sergei Palkin thinks.  
2) Every project could fail, even the best planned. First of all because it is very difficult to 
go with respect to the project’s algorithm (means of production have a property to move 
and mix, people can be sick, media can make pressures, even the mood of directors 
affects the project).  
3) Corporate culture and team building is a good mean of management control. Bonuses 
systems work very well in Ukraine, because people feel that they may not only influence 
the project, by also get bonuses for their good work.  
4) Be ready to cultural differences and be ready to learn foreign “ways” of doing business, 
because you could learn a lot from every project.  
5) Since the aim of the project was to finish the stadium before EURO – 2012, the project 
was started earlier. Time was not a crucial factor.    
6) Initial and planning stages are the most important for successful handling risks and 
uncertainties, because you have to consider many problems and uncertainties on the 
earlier stages. Only personal experience, knowledge and learning by doing can help you 
with it.  
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MAIN EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
There are a lot of similarities between Norwegian and Ukrainian projects, as well as differences. 
First of all, budgets, time of realization, ideas and aims of the projects are almost the same. The 
major problem and uncertainty of both projects was DID NOT FINISH PROJECT on time, 
within budget and with required quality.  
 
I have found out that projects faced similar groups of uncertainties. Slow decision making 
process was a distinctive feature of both project, but it was caused by different reasons. In 
Norwegian project it was because of the luck of competence and agreement among politicians, in 
Ukrainian – because of the disagreements and difficulties in communication between contractor 
and client organization. Projects investigated were not “painted by numbers” in the beginning, 
instead they were as “walking in the fog”. In Norwegian case it happened because politicians 
could not agree what they want to do and how? In Ukrainian case – because this country does 
not have a tradition, where Client prepares description what is he/she wants to build. There were 
a lot of international contractors and subcontractors involved in the execution. Thus, problems of 
work in international teams and cultural differences have aroused in both projects. Table 4.1 
summarizes main differences between two projects.  
 
Table 4.1 Differences between Norwegian and Ukrainian projects 
Criteria Norway Ukraine 
Type of contacts  Traditional (two sides contact) Alternative (three sides contract) 
HR policy Involve people with “big” experience, 
who are ready to solve the problems 
using their intuition and personal 
abilities  
Hire yang people preferably, willing 
to work, that have new knowledge. 
People who want to gain a new 
experience.  
Government 
regulation and 
construction norms 
More or less stable, do not impact the 
project  
Changed all the time  
 Motivation  No motivation systems  Combination of financial and 
nonfinancial incentives  
Approach to 
reporting  
Monthly reports  Half-years, monthly, weekly and 
daily reports (if needed) 
Meetings  Monthly, 2 weeks Every day and even often 
Trust  Important  Trust nobody, except yourself  
Structure  Independent structure of contractor 
organization 
Duplicate system of contractor and 
client organization 
Software  OPERA Project  Spider project and MS Project 
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Trust in Norwegian project was important factor and part of MC, while in Ukrainian project 
there was no trust even within the project management team. Above mentioned factors and 
others, presented in empirical part, had influenced design of MCS and choices of MC tools, used 
for handling uncertainties in two projects under study. All four groups (levers) of MC were used 
by managers of Holmenkollen and Donbass Arena. Table 4.2 and 4.3 summarize the main 
groups of uncertainties related to the projects, their reasons and methods that project managers 
used for managing these uncertainties.  
 
Table 4.2 Holmenkollen project: main empirical findings  
 
Sources of uncertainties – 
project’s characteristics 
Most significant risks and 
uncertainties 
Ways of handling uncertainties  
- Tight schedule 
 
- Complexity of the 
project 
 
- Slow and complicated 
decision making 
process, especially on 
the earlier stages of the 
project 
 
- Construction standards 
and specific market 
situation 
 
- Impact of nature (force 
majeure) 
 
- Uncertainties in 
estimates (first of all, in  
time and quality) 
 
- Costs overruns 
 
- Late decisions  
 
- Unstable environment of 
the project 
 
- Cultural differences and 
difficulties of work in 
the multinational teams 
 
- Relations with 
architectures 
 
 
Diagnostic system of MC:  
- Budgets and performance 
measures; 
- Kick-off meetings, negotiations  
- Analytical tools (MS Access, 
Opera Project) 
- System of interdisciplinary 
checking 
- Performance matrixes  
 
Beliefs system: 
- Trust among project management 
team and to some contractors  
- Punishment and personal controls 
(if needed) 
- Stakeholders management  
- Use of experience, intuition and 
knowledge 
- Preset payments  
 
Boundary system of MC:  
- Compulsory reports/ Progression 
reports  
- Limits of responsibilities  
 
Interactive system of MC: 
- Finding “good enough decisions” 
- Proactive control and Quality 
control 
- Using help of external consultants  
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Table 4.3 Donbass Arena project: main empirical findings 
Sources of uncertainties – 
project’s characteristics 
Most significant risks and 
uncertainties 
Ways of handling uncertainties  
- Slow and complicated 
decision making 
process 
 
- Unstable Ukrainian 
law and business 
environment 
 
- “Weak” initiation and 
reduced planning 
stages of the project 
 
- Problems in Ukrainian 
mentality  
 
- Impact of nature (force 
majeure)  
 
 
 
- Time and cost overruns 
and risk of getting the 
final results that do not 
meet customer 
requirements 
 
- Bureaucracy and 
corruption 
 
- Uncertainties in relations 
with general contractor 
 
- Relations with 
architectures 
 
- Cultural differences and 
difficulties of work in 
the multinational teams 
 
- Misunderstandings of 
the partners (“Lost in 
translation”) 
 
 
 
Diagnostic system of MC:  
- Budgets and performance 
measures; 
- Kick-off meetings, every day 
negotiations  
- ICT tools (Spider project, MS 
Project) 
- Establishment of separate 
Analytical department 
- System of global monitoring 
 
Belief system of MC:  
- Use of personal experience, 
intuition and knowledge 
- Combination of financial and 
nonfinancial incentives 
- Individual-based rewards 
- Improvements in knowledge of 
new materials and in English  
 
Boundary system of MC:  
- Compulsory reports/ Progression 
reports  
- “Very thick” contact with 
contractor, including all 
responsibilities, requirements and 
so on 
- Limits of responsibilities 
 
Interactive system of MC: 
- Personal observation and controls 
-  “Harmonization” of 
organizational structures of 
contractor and client 
- Department of quality (Men in 
“blue helmets” and Department 
of Technical Supervision)  
 
 
In this chapter I provided the answer on my research question about major uncertainties in 
relation to construction projects in Ukraine and Norway and the ways of managing them. What is 
interesting is that MCS, used for handling uncertainties in both projects differ not as much as it 
was expected.  
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V. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
In this part I analyse main findings and provide answers to the questions about differences and 
similarities of MCS, being used to handle uncertainties in big construction projects in Norway 
and Ukraine. 
 
5.1 Changing nature of the same big construction project in time: from “fog” to 
“numbers”  
 
Big construction projects are not stable, they demonstrate continuous changes. Examples of big 
construction projects in Ukraine and Norway have shown that it was not easy to achieve a high 
level of accomplishment of earlier tasks in both projects. Moreover, these tasks were changed 
several times. High level of uncertainty arose due to many reasons: first of all, because of the 
complexity of projects tasks and complexity of the projects itself, and second – because of the 
changing environments of the projects. All my respondents made a joke that the most “stable” 
moment of the project was in uncertainty about finishing it in a line with a “project triangle” of 
scope, time and costs. All the time managers were confronted with problems related to 
deviations in the budget, delays in the schedule, or failures to comply with quality requirements, 
but the aim of the projects was continuing to be the same – to finish on time, within budget and 
in compliance with quality requirements. Therefore, both projects managers were in search for 
the “good enough decisions” concerning projects, i.e. correcting architectural plans, substitution 
of cheaper, but good enough materials used for construction, etc.  
 
By changing nature of big construction projects in this context I mean that projects tend to 
evolve over time, therefore management control systems for dealing with uncertainties would be 
different on different stages of the PLC. Let’s get back to the investigated projects and the 
theoretical framework. Investigated projects have been changed over time. In the beginning they 
were not “painted by numbers”, as usual building projects. Instead, they were as “walking in the 
fog” (Frigenti & Comninos, 2002). In Norwegian case it happened because politicians could not 
agree what they want to do and how. And they were lucking knowledge of how to realize such 
big project in short time period. In Ukrainian case it happened because of the distinct design of 
responsibilities between the project parties. In this country Client does not prepare detailed 
description (specification) of what he wants to build. Architectures and designers take requests 
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and wishes from clients about the design of the project and implement it. There are small 
chances for architects for the first time to prepare a prototype, which will correspond to 
customer’s wishes for 100%, therefore, architects often drew the client to the approval of the 
plan, and it takes time to have consistency regarding all the details. 
 
Thus, it can be expected that big projects have comprehensive planning stage, where rational 
calculations, clear technical requirements, dividing responsibilities among project management 
team and other project parties, and many other actions should be provided. This is very 
challenging moment of unique construction project – to fulfil the planning stage successfully, or 
at least, “carefully enough” (using the words of project managers).   
 
My first conclusion regarding the research with be the following: big 
international construction projects need transformation from the “fog” 
stage, when main stakeholders are not only unclear about how things need 
to be done, but are also not totally sure about what the end result should 
be, into “painting by numbers”, where stakeholders all know exactly what 
needs to be done, and how it needs to be done (Frigenti & Comninos, 
2002). This task can be completed by the project manager, who is a strong 
leader of the team.  
 
When the project becomes “painting by numbers” it is much easier to control it, predict possible 
problems and handle uncertainties. This conclusion brings us up to the next finding – importance 
of concretization of space and time within frames of MCS. 
 
5.2 From “fog” to “numbers” through “time and space” of the project 
 
The task – to transform a project into “painting by numbers” is, probably, one of the most 
challenging tasks of the manager of big construction project. Thus, administrating of “space and 
time” of projects could become a good approach in dealing with this problem (Smith & 
Fischbacher, 2009). Worth to notice that “space and time” approach is very topical not only in 
the management control literature. Project management researchers, particularly, in the sphere of 
risk and uncertainty management, also stress on the importance of projects to be resilient, at 
particular point in time and within particular contexts (Carpenter et al., 2001). It provides 
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ongoing protection to all threats and simply allows stability to be maintained in a changing 
environment (Smith & Fischbacher, 2009). Thus, I would argue that uncertainty management 
“cannot exist without the construction of a space within which time – as a one-dimensional 
decision parameter – can function”. Here, MCS provides some of the mechanisms which “seal 
off a production space, free it from external uncertainties and make it possible to manage by time 
alone” (Mouritsen & Bekke, 1999).  
 
There are, probably, no other types of organizations that have such an importance and 
dependence on time, as construction projects, which I analyse in my work. Thus, concretization 
of project’s space and time is very important, because projects are unique and temporary, they 
could not be postponed, repeated or “rewritten” at any time. Thus, managers do not have chances 
to fail.  
 
There is a common expression that “time is money”. In our case time is an execution cost driver 
and also a “strategic weapon”, which could be made to function as a managerial technology via 
management control. Management control tools, such as prescribed contracts with contractors 
and subcontractors (first of all suppliers of necessary details, materials, equipment, etc. for 
construction), personal controls and observations, which were used by project managers of 
projects under study, are good examples of ways to manage project’s “space”, i.e. to define the 
spheres of responsibilities and limits of liabilities of above mentioned project parties, since 
actions of suppliers could be very often uncertain, and could influence the project’s progression 
and results therefore. How it was shown in Holmenkollen case: the problems with supplier of 
steal from Poland.  
 
Another important side of managing the project’s “space” is related to the distribution of tasks 
and delegation of responsibilities among the project management team. Every single part of the 
team should know exactly what are their tasks and responsibilities, and moreover, how these 
tasks could be achieved. Project managers, being interviewed by me, succeeded in defining tasks 
for their members by preparing matrixes of responsibilities, conducting kick-off meetings and 
negotiations, using informational analytical tools for monitoring project’s progressions and 
compulsory reports, which have shown to the managers, where their employees had failed while 
performing their primary tasks.    
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Managing “space” reduces uncertainties related to responsibilities of the 
project parties. It provides economy of resources, because managing space 
of the project “saves time” on project’s realization, and money 
correspondently.  
 
5.3 Be ready to handle cultural differences while managing big construction 
projects 
 
5.3.1 Context of management control of big construction projects  
 
As we can see from the theory, all types of uncertainties are interconnected and mutually 
influenced. Having collected all the empirical data, I can say that in practice it is actually 
impossible to distinguish clearly different types of uncertainties, as they all are closely connected 
with each other. All situations and problems have its impact on all three highlighted types of 
uncertainties. That is the result of the complexity of the projects and their high costs that require 
consistent work from all parties of the project and throughout the whole duration of the project. 
Using theoretical approach by Miroshnik (2002) the environment of international projects 
consists of legal, cultural, economic and political basic elements, which influence the project 
(Fig. 5.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.1 Impact of environment on the project  
 
Projects Uncertainties: 
- In estimates; 
- Associated with project parties;  
- Related to the stages of the PLC 
Legal 
environment 
Cultural 
environment 
Political 
environment 
Economic 
environment 
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However, some of factors of above mentioned environments become less influential due to 
several reasons. Country’s economical factors of project’s environment are not significant in 
international projects, because of the impact of “globalized” economy, which leads to the use of 
the same techniques and technologies in construction, same relations with international suppliers 
and other contractors, etc. Such basic elements of environment as legal, cultural and political 
factors are still in comparative importance.  
 
Political environment, for example, was very influential in Ukraine, where international firms 
have faced a problem of bureaucracy and corruption, which I could say, became latent or implicit 
parts of Ukrainian business culture as well. Legal issues we could trace, for instance, in 
Norwegian legislation of closed tenders procedures for public sector enterprises (which caused 
additional uncertainties in relation to the project’s contractors), while in Ukraine these 
procedures are opened. Other legal problems could be seen in the local building codes and 
building practices, which are not similar in different countries, as it was in Ukrainian case with 
Turkish and German contractors. As for the cultural environment, it has very significant 
influence upon the international construction projects, since together with the host-country’s 
culture the project involve a lot of contractors from other foreign countries, which have their 
own cultures, languages, norms, values, motivations and many other factors.    
 
The fact that construction projects are much influenced by international building and contracts 
practices, and other local rules and regulations and involve many people necessitates 
distinguishing between external and internal contexts within which big construction projects 
operate. Legal, political and economical factors become a part of external context of 
management control, as they require, e.g. standardized accounting reports and other procedures, 
which cannot be changes by willingness of the project managers. The impact of economical 
external context on MCS (or rather MCS design) is mainly a result of internationalization, 
world’s construction regulation and public expectations. The latter includes also mass media, 
general public and other stakeholders’ interests to such big projects. Meanwhile, cultural factors 
in this case obtain dual characteristics. Local cultures and local management practices in 
international construction projects meet many different cultures and business practices of their 
international partners. Internal context include MCS, structures and processes, used by project 
managers for managing projects uncertainties.  
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Modifying the figure by Mellemvik et al. (1988), we can design figure 5.2, which shows the 
MCS of the projects and its context. The culture is placed on the intersection of internal and 
external contexts due to their intertwined influence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.2 Context of MC of the big construction project 
 
Thus, important factor in this intersection is culture, which obtains its impact from both internal 
and external contexts. This inner part comprises also other MCS, structures and processes 
outlined by Mellemvik et al. (1988), but it must be noticed that they are also subjected to both 
internal and external contexts.  
 
5.3.2 Uncertainties and sources of uncertainties: similar content – different reasons 
 
In principle, many projects uncertainties can be removed in pre-execution stages by attempting 
to specify what is to be done, how, when, and by whom, at what cost (Chapman, 2003). In 
practice, significant amount of this uncertainty may remain unresolved through much of the 
PLC. Our projects faced uncertainty on the execution stage where there were some design 
changes. Thus, a widespread challenge in projects is to have the design and plan stages carefully 
enough to reduce further uncertainties related to the projects estimates, project parties and other 
stages of the PLC.  
 
This problem is mostly significant when stakeholders are trying to oblige difficult for realization, 
practically unrealistic milestones dates and budget bounds (Atkinson, 2006). In both cases, 
project management teams were confronted with similar uncertainties, except of several factors, 
which are singularities of Ukrainian and Norwegian contexts, which are illustrated in Fig. 5.3.   
The project (internal context) 
MCS used for handling 
projects uncertainties 
 
Cultures of parties 
involved  
 
Legal, economic, political 
and other processes in the 
environment of the project  
The context of MC (external context) 
  
Fig. 5.3 Peculiar characteristics of projects under s
 
If we look more closely at these peculiar characteristics of projects under study, we could notice 
that almost all the problems were caused by cultural environment, except of closed tenders in 
Norwegian case, which were required by law. Other factors are completely related to the cultural 
environment. Let’s give some explanations.
 
Ukrainian “cultural singularities” 
degree) and “lost in translation”
corruption as the obstacles of doing business in Ukraine are mentioned in almost all guides, 
which provide practical information for firms who are interested in Ukrainian market 
(Iermolenko & Kurtmollaiev, 2010). Thus, it is not a secret that companies have to be patient in 
dealing with Ukrainian authorities and all the time use help of native population, because they 
could explain the main rules of doing business in Ukraine. Exactly these methods were u
Ukrainian project of construction of Donbass Arena by Turkish contractor. Ukrainian mentality 
could be also added as one of the features of Donbass Arena projects, because some delays in the 
project’s schedule were related to 
 
Next singularity of Ukrainian project is “lost in translation”. Ukrainians, in general, are not very 
good in English. Even the project managers could misunderstand their international partners. 
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Moreover, Turkish partners also used interpreters for communication with Ukrainian colleagues, 
thus it created uncertainty in making decisions about the project’s future. Norwegian managers 
have also faced uncertainties in decision making, but it was caused by slow agreement among 
politicians. The reason of slow decision making could be seen – in Norwegian culture. Norway is 
egalitarian society, where every member has its own right and voice. While deciding about 
Holmenkollen project future, every member of Oslo Municipality has tried to include his/her 
own vision. Thus, projects under study had faced single uncertainty, which was on account of 
different reasons that came from the cultural environment.  
 
Common uncertainties of projects investigated were related to the underestimation of costs 
analysis and detailed planning stages, some failures in relation to designers, contractors and sub-
contractors. Impact of nature – force majeure was also considered as important factor of project’s 
uncertainties, since construction was executed outdoors. The most influential problem of both 
projects was in cultural differences and difficulties of work in the multinational teams. Good 
knowledge in English did not help Norwegian managers to deal with their foreign partners, 
which were chosen after closed tenders. Norwegian managers defined closed tenders as one of 
the major sources of uncertainties of Holmenkollen project. I can consider it as a distinctive 
characteristic of Norwegian project that has led to the difficulties of work in multinational team. 
 
Both construction projects had shown that cultural differences are very 
influential problems in international projects. This finding ends us up with 
conclusion that project managers have to be prepared to handle different 
cultures as well as other tasks of the projects.    
 
5.4 Handling uncertainties in big construction projects 
 
5.4.1 Importance of balancing between the levers of control  
 
MCS used for managing uncertainties in both projects have been grouped in accordance to the 
Simon’s model of levers of control, as it was shown in empirical part. Fig. 5.4 illustrated that all 
the levers were utilized in Norwegian Holmenkollen and Ukrainian Donbass Arena projects. In 
general, MCS of both projects are very similar. Diagnostic and interactive controls are almost 
identical. Belief systems are slightly different, since Ukrainian project managers in contrast to 
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Norwegian ones used both financial and nonfinancial incentives to build a MCS. There are some 
principal differences in balancing between boundary controls between two investigated projects. 
It happened due to some contextual factors, which I explain hereinafter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.4 Balancing between levers of control in two contexts 
 
 
                 Norway             Ukraine  
 
Boundary control system – is wider and stronger in Ukrainian context because managers do not 
trust their colleagues and contractors, while Norwegian managers see the trust as important 
factor of MC, at least among team members. That is why Ukrainian managers tried to provide 
more boundaries and limits of freedom of their employees. They did not want to put all 
responsibilities regarding the project on their contractor from Turkey. The reason of distrust lies 
in Ukrainian culture and mentality, which have been originated in the Soviet times. Another 
important moment is that it is very common practice in Ukraine to use “carrot and stick” type of 
motivation. That is why boundary controls are broader, as well as a belief system. Belief control 
system in Ukraine – is wider than in Norwegian project. Managers of Donbass Arena used a 
Belief system 
Interactive 
system 
Diagnostic system 
Boundary 
system  
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combination of financial and nonfinancial incentives, while Norwegians mostly used 
nonfinancial incentives, and preset payment for work. They tried to build an atmosphere of 
“doing something big and important”. However, all Holmenkollen respondents considered that 
this system needs some improvements: first of all strengthen in terms of some “bonuses” system. 
Therefore, I will consider that belief system was a bit stronger in Ukrainian project.  
 
As for diagnostic systems of the projects, they are almost identical. Both projects used budgets 
and performance measures, kick-off meetings, negotiations, ICT tools, etc. The difference was in 
frequency of the diagnostic actions. Ukrainian managers tried to do it every day, but Norwegians 
were more “advanced” and gave more freedom to their subordinates, and consequently provided 
less controls (e.g. once a week, once a month). Budgets in both MCS were considered as 
important, but in both cases these budgets were not met, thus they were corrected over time. As 
for the ICT tools, both project management teams used local versions of MS Project (Opera 
Project and Spider Project – in Norway and Ukraine respectively). 
 
There are some differences in interactive control systems of the projects, as it is shown in the 
Figure 5.4. Norwegian interactive system (formally) is broader than Ukrainian one, first of all 
because of the use of external consultants’ help while making plans for the future. Consultants 
did both qualitative and quantitative research and prepared comprehensive analysis and reports 
concerning project’s progression. There were no such official agreements between Donbass 
Arena and other external consultants from the very beginning, as it was in Norwegian project. 
Analytical department was mainly responsible for gathering information and making reports for 
the project manager and director. However, in reality managers of Donbass Arena during 
execution resorted to external specialists, first of all to Ukrainian research institutes and other 
project managers all over the world, which had practice in managing of construction of other 
stadiums (Portugal, Germany, Holland, China, etc.). My respondents agreed in their interviews, 
that use of external consultants was absolutely necessary. As for similarities, both projects 
utilized personal observations and controls. Departments of quality were also established and 
provided quality controls and testing of materials, equipment, results of construction, etc.  
 
It is important to use all the levers of control for handling uncertainties of the 
projects: belief, boundary, interactive and diagnostic controls. The combination of 
these controls would dependent upon the context of MC or projects environment.  
  
5.4.2 Uncertainty management scheme
 
Based on empirical and theoretical material I can figure out the scheme that project managers 
could use for managing uncertainties in big projects (Fig. 5.5). 
 
 
Fig. 5.5 Uncertainty management in the big construction projects
 
First step in overcoming uncertainties is defining uncertain situation 
stage “walking in the fog” to “painting by numbers” 
personal knowledge, experience and intuition
“space and time” of the project and to design MCS, balancing different levers of control: belief, 
boundary, interactive and diagnostic.
based on the information obta
uncertainty. 
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5.5 Few differences in MCS in handling uncertainties of big construction projects in 
Ukraine and Norway (impact of globalization and internationalization?) 
 
In the beginning of Thesis, I have made an assumption based on the theory (Mellemvik et al., 
1988; Scott, 2008; Peters, 2005; Miroshnik, 2002, etc.), that two investigated projects would 
have contrasting managerial practices regarding handling uncertainties in big construction 
projects. It happens because of the differences in both – external and internal environments of 
the projects. According to the researchers in this field, different contexts would lead to different 
taken-for-granted regularities of managers’ behaviour. I supposed that strategies, structures and 
technologies which could be appropriate in one country may lead to failures in another 
(Miroshnik, 2002), and even if the projects face the same groups of uncertainties, managers 
would cope with it differently.  
  
Countries of interest really have different institutional environments. They use different 
construction norms and rely on different business practices. Examining the MCS in Norwegian 
and Ukrainian projects, described in the previous chapter, I have obtained interesting results 
which are contrary to the expectations and assumptions of the theoretical framework.  
 
I have found out, that managers of big international projects in Ukraine and Norway handled 
uncertainties using almost the same MC tools. This surprising finding could be explained by the 
fact that projects under study are international. Both Norwegian and Ukrainian projects involved 
contractors and subcontractors from different countries, for instance architectures of both 
projects were foreign companies. Internationalization and globalization harmonize the contexts, 
in which big international projects realize. There are, of course, some differences in external and 
internal contexts of the projects, which determine sources of uncertainties, since countries have 
different cultures, legislation, mentality, etc. 
 
Thus, internationalization and globalization of economy seem to have 
impact construction industry, and the choice of tools and MCS used for 
handling uncertainties in international construction projects. 
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VI. CONCLUSION, CONTRIBUTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
6.1 Summary of the study  
 
This research has studied how uncertainties are being understood and managed in big 
construction projects in different contexts. It was carried out gradually, step-by-step. First, I have 
analyzed important concepts and components that underpin the relevant theory to the problem 
statement. I described main groups of uncertainties related to the big construction projects, and 
then applied MC theories in order to understand how these uncertainties could be managed in 
different contexts from the theoretical perspective. Empirical data, consisting of two cases, 
present major uncertainties and the ways how they were managed in relation to construction 
projects in Ukraine and Norway. An interesting and unexpected moment of my research – is in 
empirical findings. Examining the MCS in Norwegian and Ukrainian projects, I have obtained 
interesting results which are contrary to the expectations and assumptions of the theoretical 
framework. 
 
On the question: “Are there big differences in management control in construction projects in 
Norway and Ukraine?” I could give the answer now: “Yes, there are some, but probably not as 
dramatic as it was expected!”I attribute this to the fact that globalization and internationalization 
affect the construction industry, as well as other spheres of economy. However, I defined some 
differences in external and internal contexts of the projects.  
 
Analysis of differences and similarities between MCS in handling uncertainties in construction 
projects in Norway and Ukraine, have led me to the following conclusions: 
 Big international construction projects need transformation from the “fog” stage, when 
main stakeholders are not only unclear about how things need to be done, but are also not 
totally sure about what the end result should be, into “painting by numbers”, where 
stakeholders all know exactly what needs to be done, and how it needs to be done; 
 Transforming a project into “painting by numbers” could be done using the “space and 
time” approach. Managing “space” reduces uncertainties related to the responsibilities of 
the project parties. It “saves time” on project’s realization and money correspondently.  
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 Cultural differences are very influential problems in international projects. Thus, project 
managers have to be prepared to handle different cultures as well as other tasks of the 
projects; 
 Internationalization and globalization of economy seem to have impacted construction 
industry, and the choice of tools and MCS used for handling uncertainties in international 
construction projects; 
 It is important to use all the levers of control for handling uncertainties of the project: 
belief, boundary, interactive and diagnostic controls.  
 
Based on the above mentioned findings it is possible to figure out the simplified scheme of 
overcoming uncertainties in big construction projects: first – it is important to define uncertain 
situation and transform it from the stage “fog” to “painting by numbers” by using a combination 
of external help, personal knowledge, experience and intuition. After those actions – specify the 
“space and time” of the project and to design MCS, balancing different levers of control: belief, 
boundary, interactive and diagnostic. The last step in this process is implementing decisions 
based on the information obtained from the MCS. Worth to notice, that big construction projects 
need experienced project manager, who could take a role of a strong leader of the team.   
 
6.2 Contributions   
 
I believe that my research have its theoretical and practical contribution, and the main research 
findings could be valuable for other researchers in the same particular field, as well as for 
practitioners, who involved in management of international construction projects. Results of the 
current research may be presented at the network meeting of the Norwegian-Ukrainian Chamber 
of Commerce (Oslo), and latter could be used by the Ukrainian, Norwegian or other companies 
from the different countries which are thinking about collaboration. 
 
The research reported here makes a contribution to management control literature in different 
ways. First, I analysed main groups of uncertainties related to the big construction projects, using 
project management literature, and then applied management control theories in order to 
understand how these uncertainties could be managed in different contexts from the theoretical 
perspective. Thus, I combined two theoretical perspectives: of management control and project 
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management for analysing one problem. I have found some parallels in management control and 
project management literature concerned the concept of “space and time” of the projects. 
Second, I have shown how the framework, elaborated by Simons, may fruitfully be applied to 
big construction project. This is relevant in light of the debate on the usefulness of Simons’ 
framework beyond the scope of literature in MC (Grandori & Furnari, 2008). 
 
I want to add also that the study of managing uncertainties in big construction projects is in the 
line of the most topical themes for research nowadays. According to Berry et al. (2009) concept 
of uncertainties (risks) and culture in MC are emerging themes in management control literature. 
The theoretical roots of this management control research are multiple, but with most studies still 
in the functionalist and positivist traditions, thus it seems essential that more emphasis should be 
placed on the study of real control systems as they operate in practice, especially design and use 
of MCS (Berry et al., 2009).   
 
6.3 Limitation of the research 
 
The notion of management control in the project management is rather broad and it is impossible 
to be studied from all the perspectives in the Master Thesis. Hence, to avoid some potential 
misunderstandings and to outline where the study is supposed to create value I have to define the 
following limitation of the research:  
- I concentrate my efforts on study of the MCS in the big construction projects in Ukraine 
and Norway. Due to the time, financial constrains and rare nature of such big 
construction projects I study one project from the side of Norway and one construction 
project from the side of Ukraine.  
- I studied MCS from the managerial perspective. 
 
6.4 Research opportunities and further disposition of the thesis  
 
Management control continues to be a fertile field of research development (Otley et al., 1995). 
Berry et al. (2009) point out that there has been relatively little research on control and 
uncertainties and upon management control and culture. Thus, it proves the fact that the topic of 
my research is relevant, topical, interesting from the theoretical and practical perspective and 
definitely needs further research. 
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To the better comprehend of the topic it seems to be logical to observe some other contexts, 
except of Norwegian and Ukrainian, and to investigate other big construction projects, for 
example, in China, USA, and Germany, and to try to determine some kind of trends, depending 
on characteristics of intended conditions. Thus, more empirical studies investigating 
management control systems in international construction projects are needed. Much more case 
research is necessary to yield insights into how organizations can develop effective rules and 
procedures to manage uncertainties related to the project parties, project estimates and 
uncertainties associated with different stages of the PLC.  
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 VIII. APPENDIXES 
 
Appendix A: Classification of the projects 
 
 
Criteria Type of the project 
 
Purpose of the 
project 
- Commercial (the ultimate goal is getting profit)  
- Non-commercial (the goal is achievement of social effect) 
By industry 
sector 
- Industrial 
- Construction  
- Transport  
- Educational  
- Trading    
- Complex 
Size - Small (Less than $10 mln / Men-hours < 40-50 thousands); 
- Medium ($10-50 mln); 
- Big ($50 -100 mln); 
- Huge (More than $100 mln/ Men-hours > 20 mln) 
Execution time - Short-term (< 3 years) 
- Medium-term (3-5 years) 
- Long-term (> 5 years) 
By function - Manufacturing 
- Technological   
- Financial  
- R&D/ Marketing  
- HR - management 
- Combined 
By degree of 
difficulty 
 
- Mono-projects (simple separate projects)  
- Multi-projects (complex projects, consisting of a series of mono – 
projects and requiring a multifaceted PM) 
- Megaprojects ( > $1 billion, 5-7 years; target-oriented programs for the 
development of regions, sectors, comprising a number of mono-and 
multi-projects) 
By nature of the 
parties involved 
- International (cooperation with organizations (World Bank, UNIDO), or 
foreign countries) 
- National, interregional (development of national economy) 
- Regional (projects of regional significance) 
- Local (projects of local economic development) 
- Sectoral (projects, covering the interests of one sector) 
- Official / departmental (projects implemented within a single agency) 
- Corporate (projects aimed at achieving the corporate effect) 
- Projects of a single enterprise (Various projects undertaken by one 
enterprise). 
 
Source: developed by author  
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Appendix B:  The efficiency of methods used in the process of stakeholder engagement 
 
 
Purposes Methods 
Identifying 
stakeholders 
1.1 Personal past experience  
1.2 Asking the obvious/identified stakeholders to identify others 
1.3 Guidelines from governments or one’s own organization 
1.4 Professional services  
1.5 Being directed by a superior  
Gathering information 
from stakeholder 
2.1 Focus group meeting 
2.2 Personal past experience 
2.3 Interviews  
2.4 Public consultation  
2.5 Formal memos  
2.6 Questionnaires  
Estimating 
stakeholders 
3.1 Personal past experience 
3.2 Workshops  
3.3 Interviews  
3.4 Public engagement approaches  
3.5 Surveys  
Making 
decisions 
4.1 Meetings  
4.2 Negotiations  
4.3 Social contracts  
4.4 Guidelines  
4.5 Appealing to Executive Council  
Implementing 
decisions 
5.1 Meetings  
5.2 Workshops  
5.3 Negotiations  
5.4 Interviews  
5.5 Social contracts  
5.6 Public engagement approaches 
5.7 Surveys  
 
Source: adapted from Yang et al. (2010) 
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Appendix C: Interview Guides  
 
Interview Guide in English  
 
The purpose of this interview is to discuss critical matters of management control in the big 
construction project. Answers will be used for writing a Master Theses. 
Thank you for your attention! 
 
1. What are the main peculiarities of being a manager of a big project? Could you specify 
some typical challenges you could face with during realization of the big construction 
project?  
 
2. Which standards did you use in your work? Are they local or global? Could you, please, 
name some of them? 
 
3. How could you describe, in few words, the environment of the project (relationship with 
local authorities, government, suppliers and other stakeholders)? Did you have some kind 
of stakeholders’ management? 
 
4. What management control tools did you use during the project life cycle (PLC), e.g. 
SWOT analysis, matrix of responsibilities, etc.? Did you use different tools during the 
different project’s phases (initiation, planning, organizing, control and monitoring, 
closing the project)? Could you please give some examples? 
 
5. What were the most important sources of uncertainty in your construction project? Could 
you please give some examples? 
 
6. How did you manage these uncertainties? Did you use analytical techniques? Or did you 
prefer to use your intuition and qualitative judgments when making decisions? Maybe 
you applied something else? What exactly and how? 
 
7. How information was gathered and used for making decisions? How did you monitor 
risks? How did you evaluate information and decisions? Why did you use these 
techniques? 
 
8. Could you briefly describe the system of management control used during the project (for 
instance month plans, weekly reports, meetings, etc.)?  
 
9. Were there any situations where you have found out the divergence of the results 
achieved with the results planned during the realization of the project (e.g. deviations of 
the budget, quality, time, etc.)? How did you overcome it? 
 
10. Does experience from being a manager of another big construction project help to take 
into account all the uncertainties and improve projects disputable decisions? Is it 
important to have personal contacts (e.g. with suppliers, authorities) for realization such a 
big project? 
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Вопросы для обсуждения на русском языке 
 
Цель этого интервью – обсудить особенности управления крупным строительным проектом 
в Украине. Результаты обсуждения будут использованы для написания магистерского 
исследования. 
 
Спасибо за Ваше внимание! 
 
1. В чем заключаются особенности управления большим проектом? Назовите, 
пожалуйста, несколько «типичных» проблем, с которыми может столкнуться 
менеджер в ходе реализации крупного строительного проекта?  
 
2. Какие стандарты были использованы при строительстве «Донбасс Арены» 
(международные, национальные)?  
 
3. Как бы Вы могли описать окружение проекта (отношения с местными властями, 
инвесторами, правительством, поставщиками, подрядчиками и др. заинтересованными 
сторонами)? Есть ли у Вас специальный план по управлению взаимоотношениями со  
скейкхолдерами?  
 
4. Какие инструменты управленческого контроля Вы использовали при реализации 
проекта (например, SWOT-анализ, матрица ответственности и т.д.)? Использовали ли 
Вы различные методы и инструменты на разных этапах жизненного цикла проекта 
(инициации, планирования, организации, контроля и мониторинга, закрытия проекта)? 
Если да, то укажите, пожалуйста, какие именно.  
 
5. Назовите, пожалуйста, наиболее важные источники рисков и неопределенностей в 
строительном проекте? Как Вам удалось преодолеть их? Использовали ли Вы 
аналитические методы (например, NPV), программное обеспечение? Или же в 
большинстве случаев вы предпочли полагаться на свою интуицию и качественные 
суждения при принятии решений?  
 
6. Каким образом вы отслеживали информацию, необходимую для принятия решений? 
Как оценивается информация и сами решения? Почему вы используете именно эти 
методы?  
 
7. Как выглядела система управленческого контроля, которую Вы использовали в ходе 
реализации проекта (например, месячные планы, еженедельные отчеты, совещания и 
т.д.)?  
 
8. Сталкивались ли Вы с ситуациями, которые характеризовались расхождением 
достигнутых результатов с запланированными (например, отклонения по бюджету, 
качеству, времени и т.д.)? Как вы эти ситуации преодолели?  
 
9. Как Вы думаете, опыт работы с другим большим строительным проектом помогает 
учесть все риски и неопределенности, возникающие в ходе реализации проекта?  
 
10. Важно ли иметь личные контакты (например, с поставщиками, органами власти) в 
Украине для успешной реализации проектов такого масштаба, как строительство 
«Донбасс Арены»? 
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Appendix D: Structure of the project management team of Holmenkollen project 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Source: developed by author  
 
Project manager 
- Coord. construction management  
- Planning  
- HSE (Health-Safety-Environment) 
coordinator 
 
Project 
steering and 
administration 
Planning 
issues 
 
Juridical 
department 
Procurement 
and quality 
committee 
Arena and 
trails 
Midtstubakken  Holmenkollbakken  
Group of 
Construction 
managers I  
Group of 
Construction 
managers II 
Group of 
Construction 
managers III 
Temporary construction  
Snow production  
Security systems  
Technical infrastructure   
Group of Construction 
managers IV 
Electricity/ICT/Tech. 
control/ VVS 
 
Contractors 
doing 
execution  
